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PRE F ACE 
The long-term programme of the Research Unit is 
greatly concerned with a continuing investigation of 
the economics of expanding agricultural production in 
New Zealand. Much of this expansion is expected to 
come from the development of the hill country of both 
islands. In this paper, we report on the second 
part of a survey of hill country sheep farms in the 
North Island, where sixteen development programmes 
that have already been undertaken are assessed by 
means of present worth analysis. 
In the first section of the paper, the reader 
will find a brief summary of the farms and the main 
results of a comparative analysis of the development 
programmes; in the second section, a more detailed 
discussion of methods of development, and in the 
third, actual details of the individual farms that 
were visited and analysed. 
As indicated in Publication No. 14, most of 
the data for the analysis was provided by the Meat 
and Wool Boards' Economic Service. We are grateful 
to them, and the farmers concerned, for making this 
information available. We are also grateful to the 
Department of Agriculture for making Mr Holden's 
services available for a considerable period. 
Mr Holden is now with the Institute of Applied 
Economic Research in the University of Melbourne, 
hence the final preparation of the results of the 
analysis and writing-up were undertaken in this 
office. We apologise for the delay this has caused 
in date of publication. 
January 1967 
R.W.M. Johnson 
Act.ing-Director 
CON TEN T S 
I AN OUTLINE OF THE RESULTS 
II A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE CASE HISTORIES 
III THE CASE HISTORIES 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
J 
K 
L 
M 
N & 0 
P 
R 
Page 
1 
10 
23 
28 
33 
38 
42 
46 
51 
57 
61 
65 
68 
72 
76 
80 
83 

1 
I 
AN OUTLINE OF THE RESULTS 
This report completes the survey of profitability on 
North Island hill-country sheep farms begun in 1964. The 
methods to be followed in the study have been set out in a 
previous publication in this series.* It was originally 
intended to analyse thirty North Island hill country sheep 
farms to be drawn, with the approval of the owners, from the 
New Zealand Meat and Wool Boards' Economic Service records. 
In the event, over half of these farms could not be included 
as most of them had not completed their development programmes 
sufficiently, or had incomplete records of essential physical 
data during development. This left fourteen farms out of 
the original selection of thirty; the present number of 
sixteen farms being made up by utilising the records of two 
demonstration farms of the Department of Agriculture. 
The distribution of the sixteen case study farms is 
shown on the map overleaf; six in the Waikato-King Country 
area, two near Taumaranui, one each in the Bay of Plenty and 
Central Plateau, two in the Wanganui-Manawatu hinterland and 
four on the wairarapa coast. In terms of rainfall and 
topography it is possible to divide the case studies into 
four groups which cut across the classification by area. 
These details, and an indication of the surface cover, are 
shown in Table I. There is a clear tendency for higher 
rainfall to be associated with a forest clearing or heavy 
reversion problem. On the east coast, reversion is still 
present, but the general problem is more one of raising soil 
fertili ty to choke out low-fert.ili ty plant. species rather 
than clearing heavy scrub infestation before pasture improve-
ment. Topography is important, finally, as being the 
decisive factor in choosing between cultivation methods of 
pasture improvement and aerial methods of over-sowing. 
* 
"The Profitability of Hill Country Development - Part I: 
Analytical Methods", Agricultural Economics Research 
Unit Publication No. 14, 1965. 
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TABLE I SUMMARY OF CASE STUDIES 
Case County Topography Rainfall 
1. STEEP HILL COUNTRY WITH HIGH RAINFALL 
A Tauranga Steep,unploughable 80" 
B Taumaranui " " 70" 
C Waikato '" " 52" 
D Taumaranui Steep, largely 70 11 
unploughable 
E Rangitikei Steep, partly 50-55" 
unploughable 
2. STEEP HILL COUNTRY WITH LOWER RAINFALL 
F 
G 
H 
Castlepoint 
Castlepoint 
Masterton 
Steep, _partly 
plougnable 
Steep, partly 
ploughable 
Steep, partly 
ploughable 
35" 
35-38" 
3. PLOUGHABLE HILL COUNTRY WITH HIGH RAINFALL 
J 
K 
L 
M 
Waitomo 
Te Kuiti 
Te Kuiti 
Matamata 
Part.ly ploughable 75" 
" 70" 
Mostly ploughable 60 11 
" 65" 
4. PLOUGHABLE HILL COUNTRY WITH LOWER RAINFALL 
N Akitio Partly ploughable 45" 
o Manawatu " " 45-50" 
3 
Fern & Forest 
Reverted scrub 
Scattered scrub 
& fern 
Scattered scrub 
& fern 
Scattered scrub 
& fern 
Scattered scrub 
Browntop/ 
Danthonia 
10 II 
Scrub & Forest 
Scattered scrub 
Ligh t reversion 
New development 
Browntop/ 
Danthonia 
Danthonia/ 
brown top 
P Waikato Mostly 
Part.ly 
" 52" Scattered scrub 
R Taupo " 55-60" New development 
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The procedure followed for each case study was first, 
to obtain the physical details and financial results of 
development, and then to visit the farm and discuss methods 
of development and any other details that were not clear. 
These descriptive details and part of the physical and 
financial information collected are set out in Part III of 
this publication. Next, the records of each farm were 
carefully re-organised along the lines shown in Publication 
No. 14. The first step is to convert all costs and returns 
to a single set of prices, to remove the effects of the 
cost-price squeeze. 1962/63 was chosen as the base year, 
and indices of price changes were used t.o bring costs and 
returns to constant values or real terms. The second step 
was to establish a base year for development, and to 
identify the net income of the farm at that time. This 
pre-development surplus is sometimes called the "status-quo" 
surplus. Thirdly, the pattern of costs and returns during 
development itself, over and above their pre-development 
levels, was isolated. Finally, the post-development surplus 
was calculated. The analysis of each farm thus provided 
3 sets of basic data of interest: 
( a) 
(b) 
(cl 
Changes in money income before tax; 
Changes in real income before tax; 
Changes in real income after tax. 
The series of data for each of these important concepts 
* were then expressed in present worth terms. The present 
worth expresses in a single figure t.he obvious ups and downs 
in profits which take place in a typical farm development 
plan. In the first few years stock are held back and develop-
ment expenditure is high, hence the surplus at this stage is 
usually far below the pre-development surplus. As stock and 
wool sales increase, however, and development expenditure 
falls off, the surplus also increases quite markedly, and 
generally rises to a level well in excess of that at the 
beginning. The present worth is thus a kind of average of 
profits over the whole period of development. 
The present worth concept is further modified in this 
publication. In order to analyse the 16 case studies 
together, it is necessary to express the present worth of 
* See Publication No. 14, p.8. 
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each development programme on a uniform basis. This is done 
by calculating a profitability ratio. The ratio is defined 
as the present value of net income per pound (£l of borrowed 
money to maintain income.* Thus for each of the three main 
series of data above, the rate of discount was assumed to be 
6 per cent, and the total stream of surpluses was discounted 
back to the beginning of development. Borrowing was measured 
by the overdraft that was required from year to year to main-
tain pre-development net income, and also discounted back to 
the beginning. 
An example will make the procedure clear. If the pre-
development surplus was £1,000 and during 3 years of develop-
ment the surplus was £500, £750 and £1,250, then the change 
in farm surplus was -£500, -£250 and +£250. If the farm 
then continued to make a surplus of £500 extra in subsequent 
years, this would represent a capital sum of £8,300 at 6 per 
cent capitalisation. The top line of the profitability ratio 
can thus be expressed as: 
* 
- 500 x 1 = - 472 
(1 .06) 1 
- 250 x 1 = - 223 
(1006)2 
-+ 250 x 1 ,., + 209 
( 1006)3 
+8300 x 1 
(1.06r 
£6483 
The justification for this ratio is based on the fact 
that most of the development programmes were financed 
out of income, hence capital rationing was the most 
effective restraint on development. 
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The sum of these terms is the present worth of the 
surpluses generated by farm development. The lower line 
of the ratio is found from the overdraft element only, viz: 
500 x 1 = 472 
(1.06) 1 
250 x 1 = 223 
(1,06)2 
£695 
the final ratio being 6483 = 9.3 
b95 
The internal rate of return was calculated as the 
second measure of profitability. This is the rate of 
interest which is earned on the borrowing element of the 
farm surpluses. To calculate it, the positive returns of 
£250 and £500 above are regarded as the interest received on 
the sums of £500 and £250 borrowed earlier in this example. 
The actual rate of return is found by trying various rates 
of interest, e.g. 10 per cent and 20 per cent. 
- 500 x 1 = 
- 250 x 1 = - 206 
+ 250 x 1 = 
+5000 x +3756 
+3283 
- 500 X __ 1,--'7 
(1020)1 
- 250 x 1 
+ 250 x 1 
= - 416 
= - 174 
= + 144 
= +1446 
+1000 
The answer is, in fact, that rate of discount which 
brings the present worth of the series down to zero. At 
20 per cent the present worth is £1,000. At 30 per cent 
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it would be £240; at 40 per cent it would be -£62, hence the 
actual internal rate of return comes out as 39 per cent in 
the above example. The results of these calculations for 
15 of the case study farms are set out in Table II. 
A 
L 
N 
K 
M 
o 
B 
D 
F 
C 
H 
G 
E 
P 
J 
TABLE II SUMMARY OF RESULTS (3) 
Ratio of Present Worths(l) Internal Rate of Return 
Real (2) Money Real Money 
Pre-tax Post-tax Pre-tax 
12.21 
8.96 
1. 76 
1. 71 
1.68 
1.41 
0.67 
0.42 
.0.32 
0.20 
0.07 
-0.20 
-0.28 
-0.33 
-0.69 
11. 75 
6.26 
0.88 
1.11 
0.72 
1.04 
0.15 
-0.03 
-0.35 
-0.09 
-0.04 
-0.48 
-0.38 
-0.50 
-0.75 
10.64 
9.20 
5.59 
2.44 
1.80 
4.97 
1.05 
0.74 
0.74 
0.26 
0.48 
-0.10 
0.65 
-0.11 
-0.68 
Pre-tax Post-tax Pre-tax 
77.3 
33.9 
10.9 
12.3 
15.0 
11.5 
8.0 
7.7 
7.0 
6.7 
6.2 
5.0 
5.0 
4.4 
2.3 
80.3 
31. 2 
8.9 
10.6 
11.0 
10.3 
6.5 
5.7 
4.0 
5.5 
5.7 
4.0 
4.0 
3.5 
1.9 
62.0 
34.4 
21.2 
14.4 
17.4 
24.2 
9.0 
8.9 
9.0 
6.9 
8.4 
5.0 
15.0 
5.4 
2.4 
1. Ratio of present worth of additional income to present 
worth of net borrowings, both discounted at 6 per cent. 
2. Converted to 1962/63 costs and prices. 
3. Case R is omitted, see text. 
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The sixteenth farm, case R, is unusual in that 
development took place out of income without diminishing 
the pre-development surplus. There was thus no borrowing 
in the early years of the development programme, and the 
above calculations could not be made. The present worth 
of the development surplus is available, however, and this 
criterion would place case R about halfway down the list of 
farms in Table II, in terms of discounted surpluses. 
The most important series of calculations are those 
based on pre-tax real income. These results show the real 
contribution of goods and services to the nation, and hence 
the best use of lending money to the farming community. The 
post-tax real income results show the real effects as they 
concern individual farmers, while the pre-tax money results 
are a record of the financing of development. as it actually 
happened. Table II shows the profitability ratio and 
internal rate of return for these three concepts for each 
of the 15 case farms with data available. 
On the basis of pre-tax real income, twelve farms 
(including case R) had a positive profitability ratio, and 
only four had a negative ratio. Two of the case farms had 
exceptionally good results in terms of the above criteria, 
and four more were entirely satisfactory. The four farms 
with negative ratios are those which failed to reach an 
internal rate of return of 6 per cent. This means that if 
the overdraft in real terms in the first. years of develop-
ment had been charged at 6 per cent, these farms would not 
quite break even. They would break even at the internal 
ra tes of ret.urn shown. 
The present worth ratio in real terms after tax 
is a better guide to the individual farmer. Here the order 
of the farms is roughly t.he same, but eight now fail to 
pay 6 per cent on their overdraft requirements. Some 
farmers are penalised more t.han others by the payment of 
income tax, as successful development programmes necessarily 
improve taxable personal income considerably, especially 
as the rate of new development falls off. 
In money terms, the profitability ratio tends to 
be a little higher than in real terms before tax, as the 
cost-price squeeze tends to reduce real income compared 
with money income. 
would fail to pay 6 
during development. 
in Part II below. 
Only three of the 15 farms in Table 
per cent interest on net borrowings 
The reasons for this are discussed 
The pattern shown .. according to the internal rate 
of return, follows fairly closely that already discussed. 
The relationship between the two measures is not exact, 
however, especially at higher internal rates of return. 
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II 
In these cases the results in the early years of development 
become all-important. The three measures of internal rate 
of return also show some inner variation as the pre-development 
surplus, from which each is calculated, is not the same in 
each case. 
In general, it is possible to conclude that over 
the respective periods examined in each case study, and 
allowing for price changes, three-quarters of the development 
programmes made a definite contribution to national welfare 
in their use of scarce capital resources. At the same time, 
only half of the individual farmers were better off after 
correcting for the cost-price squeeze. In terms of money 
values, only three farms failed to make development out of 
income pay at current borrowing rates, but this is insufficient 
to meet changing prices in the future. 
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II 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE CASE HISTORIES 
Since this study was confined to case histories, the 
extension of results to all hill country development 
programmes has some limitations. The development programmes, 
which have been carried out, are specific to: 
(al the farm studies; 
(b) the economic climate existing during the 
development; 
(cl the technological advances available at the time; 
(dl the availability of loan finance at the time; and 
(e) the personal situation of the farm family involved. 
Thus generalisation could be dangerous, unless the 
evidence is clear cut, and the results in accord with farm 
management logic. But other previous studies of this 
subject have drawn conclusions on even less evidence than 
that presented in this bulletin. For example, A. Wright 
at Massey university* concluded that "hill country develop-
ment is only marginally profitable" on the basis of two 
farms, both budgeted into the future. This study then is 
some advance, and should remove many of the doubts surrounding 
a difficult, contentious problem. 
A case history approach to the problem is necessary 
because of the lack of suitable long-term data, and because 
farm development does not occur on a random basis. Farm 
development is definitely regional in its patterns, influenced 
as much by the energy of local farmers, advisers and bank 
managers, as by variations in soil type, climate or other 
farm management factors. The survey from which these 
cases were chosen is conducted by the New Zealand Meat and 
Wool Boards' Economic Service on a representative basis. 
The cases were chosen from this survey by reference to 
increases in expenditure on development items. They are 
probably as good a cross-section of farm development cases 
as can be obtained in New Zealand. 
* "The Development of Unploughable Hill Country", A. Wright. 
Unpublished M.Agr.sc. thesis, Massey College, 1963. 
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The cases themselves are described in the third part 
of this bulletin. Reference to these individual cases is 
made where appropriate; statements concerning conclusions 
based on all cases are supported by tables, and do not require 
a knowledge of each case. Each case is described in the 
third part and supported by a table showing annual livestock 
changes, cropping programmes, topdressing and oversowing 
programmes, net revenue in real terms, and taxation on real 
income. 
Method of Classification 
Because of the limitations of the selection methods 
there can be little comparability between the results of 
different cases. But in order to introduce some order into 
the list of cases they have been classified by three factors, 
(al rainfall (high or low) 
(b) topography (ploughable or unploughable) 
(c) undeveloped cover (grass or bush and scrub) . 
Clearly the classification of some cases must be 
rather arbitrary, since very few are completely unploughable, 
or were completely undeveloped. The ~ext of each case will 
indicate the accuracy of the classification. Since only 16 
farms are listed, the classification should be viewed as a 
convenience for presentation purposes only. 
Factors influencing profitability 
In a study such as this in which cases only are 
studied, there is clearly no point in trying to prove hypo-
theses. There is Ii tt.le scope for refined statistical 
analysis. The results of the cases can provide only evidence 
for or against an hypothesis. For this reason we will not 
examine every possible influencing· factor. Ra ther, we will 
examine the most important factors by isolating those pro-
grammes which would prove profitable under t.oday' s conditions 
and searching for evidence why this is so. Any tentative 
conclusions drawn will be extrapolated to all hill country 
only if the evidence is overwhelmingly in favour of that 
conclusion and the conclusion can be support.ed by farm 
management knowledge. 
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The most important factors are speed and method of 
development, availability of finance, the method of 
financing, incidence and levels of taxation, labour require-
ments, the rising level of farm costs and the use of product-
ion incentives. All but the last two can be examined in 
dfltail here; the others will be taken in turn. 
(i) Speed and method of development. 
Speed and method of development are very often 
discussed separately. But the measurement of the speed 
of development is very difficult without reference to both 
method and results of development. For example, a property 
of 1, 000 acres, grassed but for 50 acres of scrub, may: .appear 
to be developing very slowly if in one year the whole of the 
scrub is cut, burnt and oversown, and the result measured in 
terms of per cent of farm in new grass. Similarly if a 
property with no reversion problem was to develop by pasture 
improvement alone, speed could be discussed in terms of 
additional stock carried. 
It is best to measure speed by results attained in 
terms of addit.ional income, together with the method of 
development used. Table III details the properties in terms 
of their present worth per acre and lists the method of 
development, plus the increase in ewe equivalents and the 
period of development in years over which the increase 
occurred. 
The most interest.ing result for the farmer is the 
post-tax present value per acre. Firstly, there is an 
enormous range of values. Thus categorical statements that 
"hill country development is unprofitable" are unfounded. 
It can be a complete failure. But equally there appears 
to be every chance of complete success. Secondly, the 
large range indicates the importance of considering a large 
number of properties rather than confining t.he st.udy to 
two or three select properties. Thirdly, L~e importance 
of individual programmes and farm situations become obvious. 
The clear conclusion is that hill country development 
can be extremely profitable t.o the individual farmer. 
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TABLE III RATE, METHOD AND PROFITABILITY OF DEVELOPMENT 
Case Present Worth Eer acre Period percentage Annual Method 
Increase Increase of 
Breeding Develor-Pre-tax Post-tax Years Ewes % ment(I 
1. Good Ratio Farms 
A 11.8 10.5 10 45 4.5 (a) (b) 
L 20.1 7.3 4 55 13.7 ( c) 
N 27.7 13.2 14 87 6.2 (a) (b) (c) 
K 11.6 6.5 12 100 8.5 (a) (b) (cl 
M 17.4 5.7 6 41 7.0 ( c) 
0 6.1 4.1 7 100 14.3 (a) (b) 
R 28.3 22.2 4 25 6.1 ( c) 
2. Fair Ratio Farms 
B 6.6 0.6 14 110 7.8 (a) (b) 
D 4.7 -0.7 II 31 2.8 (a) (b) 
F 4.7 -4.6 13 175 13.4 ( c) 
C 1.2 -0.6 12 24 2.0 (a) (b) 
H 0.4 -0.3 13 23 1.8 (a) (b) 
3. Poor Ratio Farms 
G -3.1 -3.8 13 70 5.4 (a) (b) (c) 
E -4.1 -4.3 13 18 1.4 (a) (b) (c) 
P -7.4 -7.5 12 33 2.8 (c) 
J -14.3 -18.3 12 50 4.2 ( c) 
( 1) (al = Topdressing 
(b) = Oversowing 
( c) = Cultivation 
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The period of development, measured in years, shows a 
tendency to favour short run programmes as being the more 
profitable. The length of the period must however be read 
in conjunction with the increases in breeding ewes. 
(Breeding ewes, rather than total ewe equivalents, are used 
because all the development. programmes appeared to settle 
down to a breeding policy, after a period of fluctuating 
stock policy. Thus breeding ewe increases, as well as being 
the most meaningful, are a fair measure of total livestock 
increase. ~'he problem of assigning ewe equivalent rating 
to different stock categories is also avoided.) 
From this st.udy it is clear that the successful 
programmes are generally shorter, involving,in some cases, 
massive increases in stock numbers (cases .L, M, 0 and R) . 
Also, the profitable cases appear to have increased at 
something more than an addit.ional 5 per cent breeding ewes 
per year, and the unprofitable ones, something less. 
One anomalous case is Case F, with an annual increase 
of about 13 per cent. The details of this case suggest 
that the use of up to 4 men, plus scrub-cutting labour, 
was quite unnecessary. Also, the heavy cultivation programme 
was probably unjust.ified in the light of today's stocking/ 
fertiliser techniques. 
~eneral it. can be concluded that high rates of 
stock increases are a prereguisite to economically successful 
hill country development. 
The method of development column is suggestive, but 
dangerous. A quick glance would suggest that cultivation 
methods of development are unwise, unless accompanied by 
spectacular, cont.emporaneous increases in stock (Cases R, 
Nand Ll . This conclusion is in accord with current 
beliefs, but it would be unwise to infer from this evidence 
that the tractor is unnecessary as t.his sample contains 
several unploughable properties. 
Successful use of the tractor probably depends on 
the weed problems to be overcome by the development pro-
gramme. For exampl.e, gorse on hill country can only be 
controlled by a long expensive spraying programme, together 
with intelligent stocking at certain times of the year. 
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If the country is ploughable and gorse-infested, the tractor 
offers a sure method of control. On other hill country, 
programmes involving cultivation and root crops suffer 
economically because the sudden increase in feed available 
cannot be matched by sudden increases in wintered stock. 
This is more true the more intensive the development since 
cult.ivation methods, costing up to £40 an acre, are expensive 
and generally leave litt.le mcney surplus for t.he purchase of 
the reqcired additional stock. 
It is probably safe to say that if any development 
method other than cultivation is available and this method 
is suited to the planned stock increases, in terms of 
additional annual feed supplies, the cheaper method is to 
be preferred. 
Work at. Te Awa, and, in some cases on private farms, 
has shown that the pasture composi t.ion resulting from heavy 
stocking and fertiliser is every bit as good as that resulting 
from cultivation followed by a crop and new grass. 
The best conclusion that can be drawn is - there is 
a "cheapest" method of attaining a given result, and, once 
it has been decided on, this is the method to use on any farm. 
(ii) Availability of Finance. 
This problem is difficult to examine using the case 
history apprcach. There are really t.wo facets -
(a) Was the programme limited in any way by the 
unavailability of finance? 
(b) What finance would be needed under present day 
condi tions if the programme was t.O proceed? 
Question (a) cannot, I believe, be answered without a 
detailed survey of past and current farmer attitudes. There 
is a world of difference between lack of finance on one hand 
and unwillingness t.O borrow on the other. 'Today" s farm 
finance situation is, with the exception of anomalous 
restrictions on repayment, refinancing and overdraft limits, 
much better than even 10 years ago. However, the majority 
16 
of these farms were being developed in this earlier period 
and capital restrictions could have been important. 
More recently, an unpublished survey of Taranaki hill 
country has revealed that of 60 farmers, 55 said they were 
short of development finance, but only 3 had tried to get 
such finance. of the three, one was successful, one was 
turned down on personal grounds by the Marginal Lands Board, 
and one application was still pending. 
The question of what finance was available in these 
case-studies can be partly looked at by studying farm debt. 
Table IV lists the farms in their previous order and shows 
the maximum additional debt required, and the year in which 
it occurred. 
TABLE IV ADDITIONAL DEBT REQUIRED TO FINANCE PROGRAMME 
Case Years Max. add. debt Occurring in Year 
l. Good Ratio Farms £ 
A 10 3,962 9 
L 4 
N 14 12,400 11 
K 12 5,900 7 
M 6 450 1 
0 7 2,500 7 
R 4 4,000 1 
2. Fair Ratio Farms 
B 14 5,400 5 
D 11 400 3 
F 13 14,900 10 
C 12 5,900 7 
H 13 
3. Poor Ratio Farms 
G 13 1,500 10 
E 13 3,800 6 
P 12 1,200 6 
J 12 10,700 11 
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It. is clear that. there is no particular relationship 
bet.ween the additional required debt. and the growth of 
income. That is, the level of debt is not necessarily a 
determinant of profitability. Rather debt. is a function 
of the programme which i t.self determines profi tabili ty. 
The conclusions reached in section U) above, if implemented, 
will require a certain level of debt in most cases. The 
farmer's attitude must be to accept the level of debt 
required to secure the desired speed of development. 
I t is important t.ha t when finance is required to buy 
stock that this type of lending be generously administered. 
Too many of the case studies cultivated and top-dressed but 
left the st.ock increases to occur over time, because of an 
unwillingness to enter more heavily into debL A develop-
ment loan is much more secure to t.he lender if money for 
stock is included, because invariably an understocked area 
of new or improved grass will deteriorate. This deterior-
ation of the new asset is nothing more than an erosion of 
security. 
(iii) .Method of Financing. 
Of the 16 cases described, only 6 actually increased 
their indebtedness to finance t.he development programme and 
only one appears to have done this using mortgage finance. 
Under today' s condi t.ions many more would require additional 
finance. How should this be provided? This study does 
not answer the question but the number of development pro-
grammes having t.he ability t.o earn greater t.han the market 
rate for develcpment. finance was high. 
Now, if the rat.e of return is greater than the market 
rate, there is little point in repaying the capital if the 
repayments can be allocat.ed to further development producing 
a return greater than t.he market rat.e. Since the cases 
suggest that most development. programmes correctly carried 
out. can do this, it follows that repayment should not have 
to commence until full development was reached, if greater 
profits are the aim. 
Too, if repayments have to start the year following 
receipt of the loan money, t.his will most likely put a 
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brake on the heavy increases in stock apparently so 
necessary for success. 
The conclusion is, t.hen, that t.he method of 
financing should be such that repayment. of the loan starts 
.only when income has been raised sufficiently to meet both 
charges. 
(iv) Incidence of Taxation. 
Taxation will always be with us. Taxation revenues 
to the Treasury will not decrease. These two statements 
must be made before any discussion on t.axation can proceed. 
Now t.he many statements regarding the monetary and 
inhibitory effects of income and estate taxes are legion. 
Rather than deal with each statement, we will examine the 
cases, their tax structure and its effects, to discover 
just what real effect taxation can have, and use these 
effects to draw conclusions. Farmer attitudes to these 
effects are a different p.rDblem, and like the availability 
of finance, should be the subject of further attitude 
surveys. 
Table V shows the increases in per acre taxation 
between the beginning and t.he end of each development pro-
gramme. It alsc details t.he gross income per acre before 
development at 1962/63 prices, to give an indication of the 
level of intensity cf farming at that stage. 
Apart. from cases R, A and O. the profitable cases, 
pos t--1!ax, have cons is ten tly greater increases in taxation 
per acre. This result is a nat.ural consequence of the 
previous conclusions about. required stock increases and 
growt.h of addit.ional income. 
A just.ifiable conclusion is perhaps that tl:!~resent 
incidence of t.axation need not be a disincentive to develop-
of hil.L country. 
The main problem with taxation is therefore not that 
it inhibits development by its action but that it hinders 
additional development by its threat. No amount of exhort-
ation will persuade farmers in general that taxation can be 
beat.en. The only solution lies in changing the system of 
taxation itself. 
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The other important aspect of taxation is estate duty. 
Since this duty varies widely with individual circumstances, 
little is gained by evaluating its effects in this study. 
Further, legal procedures exist which, when carefully 
implemented, can reduce the burden of estate duty imposition. 
1. 
A 
L 
N 
K 
M 
0 
R 
2. 
B 
D 
F 
C 
H 
3. 
G 
E 
P 
J 
TABLE V RELATIONSHIP OF TAXATION PER ACRE AND 
GROSS INCOME PER ACRE 
Increase in per acre Taxation 
(Code M2) 
Gross Income per acre 
(pre-development) 
Good Ratio Farms 
Fair Ratio Farms 
Poor Ratio Farms 
£ 
0.2 
1.1 
2.1 
0.7 
1.3 
0.2 
0.4 
1.4 
0.5 
1.4 
0.4 
0.3 
0.7 
0.4 
0.8 
0.4 
£ 
2.4 
4.8 
2.6 
3.8 
12.0 
3.0 
9.2 
3.5 
7.9 
3.3 
3.3 
4.6 
3.7 
4.3 
6.2 
6.4 
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(v) Labour Requirements. 
In general, as stock numbers increase, a develDpment 
programme puts greater demands on the available labour. 
This pressure is often used as an excuse for slowing down 
the rate of increase, as in cases D and E. Unfortunat.ely 
the case history approach can provide little evidence about 
the economics of additional labour, and comments can be 
general only. 
Talking to hill country farmers one gets the impression 
that labour shortages are as great a difficulty as the so-
called shortage of finance. True, permanent labour is an 
indivisible input, the cost of which includes housing and 
facilities as well as the wages paid. But from the previous 
sections it is clear that extra labour is justified only 
when t.he extra stock is available to pay for it. Some way 
has to be found of increasing stock capacity without additional 
labour until the stock numbers reach a level which will 
support. the extra labour. 
This could be achieved by the use of dry sheep, or 
Perendale flocks, or even young cattle and converting these 
into their equivalent in breeding ewes (if these are more 
profitable), only when t.he additional expected profit will 
more than pay for the extra labour and facilities. 
The ::'abour si tuat.ion of individual cases is detailed 
in Part III, with the appropriate comments where necessary 
(see especially case F) . 
(vi) Other Factors of Importance in Development Programmes. 
Initial and maint.enance topdressing rates, subdivision, 
water supply, flock improvement programmes and other technical 
aspects of farm development programmes are undoubtedly import-
ant. In most cases, however, they are not major determinants 
of profitability. 
These "minor" factors can best be explained by 
referring t.o the conclusions drawn in previous sections. 
If the rate of stock increase is the first consideration, 
a rough plan o.f future stock increases is the first step in 
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planning. The problems of topdressing rates then become 
much easier to understand. If the soil type is such that 
the planned increases can be obtained without massive initial 
rates of topdressing there is clearly no point in using them. 
But if the planned rate of stock increase is high, the initial 
topdressing rate, at. least on parts of the property, should 
be liberal. If the provision of additional feed matches the 
additional stock available, and no more fertiliser than is 
necessary to achieve this state is used, then the initial 
rate becomes only a minor determinant of profitability. 
Similarly, a flock improvement programme is an 
unnecessary part of a development programme if massive 
stock increases are planned. The economic benefit of such 
a programme is negligible in comparison with the benefit to 
be obtained from more stock. The flock improvement programme 
should thus be regarded as a marginal factor, to be implemented 
when the rest of the development is completed and stock 
numbers stabilised at the new high level. Of course situations 
do arise in which the standard of available stock is so poor 
that the progeny was unable t.o cope with the heavy grazing 
pressure required by most development programmes. But 
this problem is best overcome by purchase of better stock, 
rather than by breeding from the poor base. 
Subdivision and water supply projects now become 
much more simple. Cases Band G both suffer financially 
from poorly-timed fencing programmes, especially the latter. 
These jobs must be done when, and not. before they become 
productive. 
Conclusions 
Since the principal determinant of the profitability 
in a given development programme appears to be the rate of 
stock increase achieved, t.here is a clear indication that 
farm development planning procedures should be based on this 
factor. If a tentat.ive stock increase plan is first decided 
upon, the development programme which best fits this plan can 
be planned in order to minimise the risk of making unproductive 
expenditures. 
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A generalised sequence of steps to be taken in 
planning farm development which takes into account the 
conclusions reached from this study would be: 
(1) Examine the present cash and capital situation. 
(2) Budget the ult.imate situat.ion. 
(3) Capitalise the difference between present and 
ultimate profits at, say, 10 per cent. This 
gives a rough indicat.ion of the maximum 
allowable development expenditure. 
(4) Define a stock increase programme which achieves the 
ultimate plan as quickly as possible, bearing in 
mind the available labour supplies and the 
present standard of stock. 
(5) 
Ie;.\ 
Define a development method which supplies the 
required annual additional feed supplies and 
which is within the limit of cost imposed by 
(3) • 
Budget each year, to determine the capital profile 
and the additional finance required and the 
best type of finance to seek. 
Contrary to belief and the conclusions of previous 
studies, the profit.ability of the development of hill-country 
can be extremely high. The successful cases were those which 
increased stock quickly, using low-cost development methods 
with minimum recourse to cultivation. The work of F.E.T. 
Suckling at Te Awa* has shown that, physically, this type of 
programme can be taken to very high stocking levels. We can 
conclude that a marked degree of confidence on the part of 
farmers intending to develop further is justified, if they 
follow the simple rules. 
Finally, as an avenue for national investment, the hill 
country of the North Island is an area which can supply the. 
additional stock numbers required, with considerable gains 
to national welfare. 
* "Stocking Rate Trials at Te Awa", F.EoTo Suckling, 
Massey Sheep farming Review, 1964. 
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THE CASE HISTORIES 
SECTION 1 Steep Hill Country with High Rainfall, 
CASE A 
General: Situated on abandoned settlement land, south of 
Tauranga, this 720 acre property is predominantly steep, 
unploughable country, with only 60 acres of rolling sandy 
loam, The balanee of the property, 660 acres, is Kaharoa 
ash Over a pumice subsoil, The altitude is about 1100', 
An annual rainfall of about 80" is coupled with a late 
spring, hard frosty winter, and a favourable summer and 
autumn 0 
Before development commenced about 450 acres of 
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the property was in standing bush; 400 acres in one block 
and the balance scattered in gullies over the rest of the 
farm, The cleared area had been brought in from fern, 
re-growth scrub, and stumps, ov"r·a period from about 1936 
to 1950, 1953 was the first year of the present develop-
ment phase, A good house and other buildings had been 
constructed but fences were in a rather poor state, All 
labour was supplied by the owner and his wife (with the son 
later); allowance has been made in the budgets for the 
son by hiring labour for jobs which could not normally be 
undertaken by the owner only, 
The owner was in his middle forties and the property 
unencumbered by mortgages, In 1960/61 a mortgage of 
£7,000 was raised to help cover the cost of the accelerated 
development, The capital value of the property (Government 
Valuation) was £4,770, including improvements of £3,240, 
For limited periods following 1953, the owner was able to 
undertake outside contract work, 
Management before Development: The farm carried 620 Romney 
ewes on a store sheep basis, Sales of 5-year ewes and 
surplus ewe lambs were associated with a fluctuating store 
wether policy, depending on seasonal wintering conditions, 
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All sales were made on~farm to various buyers, A small 
Friesian herd, mated to the Polle.d Angus bull, was just 
started in 1953, Previously, an erratic buying and 
selling policy, not limited to anyone age group, had 
been followed, 
Topdressing with 2 cwt, superphosphate per acre 
per annum over the previously developed grass paddocks 
would have been necessary to maintain the stock at the 
620 breeding ewe level, Regular drenching of lambs at 
weaning was frequently followed up by other doses later 
in the season, Footrot was little problem, Shearing 
and crutching was done by the owner, using a one~stand 
plant with the assistance of his wife, A D,2 tractor 
with blade attached, a set of discs, and a manure blower 
were the only implements available, 
The objective of development, according to the 
farmer, was increased carrying capacity, since his son 
was going to work on the place before long and net income 
was insufficient to support the whole family, 
TABLE VI CASE STUDY A, 
Year Sheep Cattle TID N/G Wool Real Est. Tax 
Surplus on real 
pre~tax Surplus 
(EE) (EE) (ae, ) (ac, ) (lb, ) (£) CO 
Pre-development 339 17 
1953-54 767 168 200 7082 218 • 
1954-55 724 156 200 7199 275 • 
1955-56 854 178 320 11317 93 • 
1956-57 852 162 200 9 8528 673 26 
1957-58 878 204 240 10 9601 1360 136 
1958-59 975 259 7707 4081 80 
1959-60 925 320 7603 798 • 
1960-61 1048 216 300 8248 718 
1961=62 4094 210 360 9280 -190 • 
'1962-63 1131 264 300 10004 1531 94 
Post~development 1023 110 
Tid Topdressing 
N/G New grass 
The Development Process: Table VI traces the build-up of stock 
numbers. the major inputs, wool output and the pre-tax and 
post-tax real surplus. The physical process of development 
covered two distinct stagesg 
(a) 1953-54 - 1959-60: renewal of poor fences, plus 
recovery of cleared country reverting to fern, 
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(b) 1960-61 - 1962-63: on completion of the rehabili-
tation of the reverted country, the logging, burning, top-
dressing and oversowing of 110 acres commenced, Due to poor 
burns this block was left with a heavy residue of logs and 
stumps. Infestation by inkweed and fireVleed in the first 
year following oversowing further reduced the contribution 
of stage (b) to higher Rtock-carrying capacity, 
In 1957 the Romney flock was discontinued and Perendales 
substituted, The owner felt that the higher lambing percentage 
and better mothering and fattening abilities of the breed would 
more than offset the drop in wool weights per sheep; his 
conclusions being reinforced by the greater numbers of 
Perendales carried per acre. The results of this change 
in policy c"n be seen in the drop in total wool weight, only 
now being rectified as more stock are carried. 
In addition to the fluctuation in Vlool production 
occasioned by .thc breed change (plus a change in double 
shearing in 19$6), lack of fencing and illness of the owner 
both contributed to high ewe losses and few sales of sllrplus female 
stock, 
Considerable trouble was experienced throughout the 
development period with lambing percentages, For the first 
few years, facial eczema, blood poisoning, and high ewe 
losses were the principal troubles, The lambing percentage 
showed an improvement following the introduction of the 
Perendales, but not to the extent envisaged by either the 
owner, or supporter,> of the breed. The. merits of the breed 
change are thus questionable in this caseo The high 
prolificacy of the Perendal" did not eventuate and the per 
acre Vlool produc tion did not keep pace with the likely 
increases the Romney would have produced, 
In the second and third years the Friesian herd was 
replaced by Polled Angus breeding cowSo Little effort was 
made to maintain this herd by breeding replacements and for 
some years nearly all progeny were 'sold as weaners or 
yearlings, In 1961/62 a fllll buying and selling policy 
was started, but collapsed the next year when the bought-in 
heifers Were retained and put to the bull, 
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For the post-development budget, the assumed stock 
numbers are 900 Perendal" ewes with 95% lambing, selling 
two-tooth ewes, tail-end ewe lambs, .300 fat wether lambs 
and the balance as store lambso The variable cattle policy 
has produced approximately £220 net profit per year 
consistently, and it is assumed this level will continue 
in the future 0 
A topdressing programme of 3 cwt, of potassic 
superphosphate with cobalt added will allow the new level 
of stocking to be maintained, In addition, 12 acres of 
contract made and carted hay will be necessary, 
Profi tabili'!:y. of Development: The present worths of the main 
measures of profitability were as follows, 
CASE Ao 
$ 
Concept Present Worth Present Worth Ratio of Present 
of SUr:l~lus of Def; ci t Worths 
£ £ 
Rsal Pre-Tax 8,434 690 12,21 
Real Post-Tax 7,462 635 11,75 
Money Pre-Tax 7,934 745 10,64 
Despite the only moderate achievements on the stock 
production side, the decision to concentrate on rehabilitat-
ion of the reverted area.s first has been highly worthwhile, 
Output has increased with a very low sacrifice of income 
during development, 
From what can be regarded in real terms today as an 
uneconomic unit of 600 ewes and supporting stock, to 900 
ewes (admittedly requiring less feed per sheep) represents 
an increase in stocking of about 5% per yearo Although 
still uneconomic by today's standards,and requiring the 
owner"s family to undertake outside work periodically, the 
owner has not allowed expenditure to reach 'big farm' levels, 
All these calculations were made on a computer, Interest 
tables equivalent to eight decimal places were used, The 
surplus for the first year of development was discounted 
one year, and the post-development surplus was capitalised 
at the end of the last year of development, Interest on 
working capital is not includedo The real surplus after 
tax can be found by deducting the tax figures shown in the 
tables, The corresponding internal rates of return can be 
found in Table II, 
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There remains the possibility that the bush development 
of th,e last stage was unnecessary. Since at the time of survey 
the full potential of the bush area was not realised, higher 
stock numbers may eventuate in time, with no further development. 
This can only result in higher profitability. 
Conclusions 
Profitability has been lifted by: 
(a) fairly high rate of stock increase 
(b) deferment of heavy development till a later stage 
(c) outside income-earning activities fully utilising 
available labour on an otherwise uneconomic 
unit 
(d) low level of pre-development income. 
Profitability has been reduced by: 
(a) indifferent stock performance levels (not due to 
under-feeding) 
(b) a fluctuating cattle policy contributing little to 
net income levels. 
On the other hand, profitability has been little 
affected by: 
(a) progressive rates of taxation (because of low 
levels of taxable income and high tax deductible 
expenses during development) 
(b) cost and price changes 
(c) the small size of the farm. 
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CASE B 
General: In complete contrast to Case A, this development programme 
took place on a large, completely run-down block. On the west 
coast of the North Island, south of Ohura in Taumarunui County, 
the 2,800 acre property was taken over in 1949 by two energetic 
brothers and developed under expert supervision as fast as 
possible, 
Altitude varies from 500' to 1,400', with 100 acres of 
disconnected alluvial flats. Most of the balance of the 
property is steep unploughable papa hills, sandy clays, and 
brownish loams of Mairoa ash shower origin, About 1,400 acres 
of this had reverted to scrub. 
Although situated in a back country area, the property 
has its own railway siding and an access road right through the 
mia.dle. One homestead and a cottage have served to house the 
partnership through the period. Water supplies were adequate for 
development. Little erosion trouble was encountered, although 
in the past slips had occurred but healed over. Ragwort was 
present but controlled by sheep management. 
Both partners were in their early thirties at takeover and 
raised a £16,000 mortgage to finance purchase and initial 
development. This loan was advanced in the fac-e of a Government 
valuation of £21,000 based on curr,mt market value soon after 
takeover. By early 1954, an independent valuation assessed the 
property as worth £32,000 providing quite adequate security for 
the mortgage. Bank overdraft rose to Over £5,000 in 1954-55 
but 'was not required after 1957-58. 
Management before Developmenb Since development commenced immediately 
the property was acquired, the pre-development situation is hypoth-
etical, Questioning of the owners, farm inspection :', and 
examination of the earl.}' records suggested a stocking of 1,650 
ewes, 750 ewe hoggets, 445 wether hoggets and 55 rams, Pre-
development stock performances were assessed at 85% lambing and 
30,0001b, wool, with sales of surplus two-tooth ewes, two-tooth 
and four-tooth wethers and 2 trucks of fat wether lambs, plus 
the usual cull ewes and cast-for-age ewes, 135 breeding cows 
were assumed necessary, male progeny being retained till 4 - 5 
years old, ano. all heifers sold young, other than those required 
for replacement. 
About £100 spent on topdressing would h~ve maintained this 
stock, if 150 - 200 acres of scrub had been cut, annually, 
Considerable attention to maintenance of existing fences (14 
paddocks) would have been necessary. 
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The Development Process: Development commenced from takeover, in 
1949. In the first 3 - 4 years 1,000 acres of scrub was cut, 
burnt, topdressed and oversown to good grass. Much of the 
topdressing and oversowing was done by hand in these early stages. 
For overs owing 11b. each of white clover, and Mt. Barker 
and Tallarook subteranean clover was mixed with 10-lb of perennial 
ryegrass. For new sowings on burns, 4-lb of short rotation 
ryegrass, 4-lb of dogstail and 1-lb of browntop was added. 
Serpentine super-phosphate at 2-cwt. per acre was applied as 
both initial and maintenance topdressing. Up till 1953/54, 
100 to 200 acres of scrub cutting, burning and oversowing 
was done annually together with continual maintenance of 
previously developed areas. Development of new areas 
slackened off after 1953/54 although 180 acres were done in 
1956/57. But the maintenance topdressing continued at 1~ 
to 1i awt. per acre, on areas up to 2,000 acres per year. 
Hand in hand with this intensive fencin~ tracking, 
clearing and grassing went a rebuilding programme. By 
1952/53 extensive work on fences and buildings had got under 
way. Bulldozing of fence lines, new tracks and culverts 
went ahead in 1953/54. In this year also considerable 
capital work on the woolshed, pewer supply and a killing 
shed was done, 
In 1954/55 fence and building work continued and a worker's 
cott~.ge commenced, The cottage was completed in 1955/56 at a 
cost of £3,400, The fence and building work continued in 1956/57 
in addition to the 180 acres of new land developmento This heavy 
programme continued right to the end of the development period 
in 1961/62 and included a new workshop and a manure bin, but', 
significantly, no new housing for the owners, They preferred 
to remain in the old dwellings until everything else was 
working at a satisfactory level, 
During the period, the assessed value of the fencing on 
the property more than trebled. The capital value of the land 
and buildings reached £42,000 by 1960, 
By the end of the development period, breeding ewes had 
increased to 3,500, with 1,480 ewe hoggets, 150 killer wethers, 
and 85 rams. Weal had increased to 60 , 0aO-Ib. Wool weights 
per sheep have been static. Towards the end of the period the 
Dorset Horn ram was introduced to increase the fat lamb Gutput. 
Stock losses in hoggets had been rather high in earlier years 
due to facial eczema and dry conditions in some summers. 
Breeding cows were rising at 26o, and the average age 
of sale for male stock substantially lower. Due to the steep 
nature of the property and the scrub reversion problem, 2~ year 
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TABLE VII CASE STUDY B. 
Year Sheep Cattle Wool T/D N/G Real EstQ Tax 
Surplus on real 
pre-tax Surplus 
(EE) (EE) (lb .• ) (ae" ) (ae .) (t) (£) 
Pre-development 
2760 2018 30,000 150 5311 2156 
1950-51 2756 2020 31,692 1000 300 1322 87 
1951-52 2891 2169 32,894 1500 300 -1216 
1952-53 3355 2476 38,276 1500 400 - 973 
1953-54 3524 3116 37,500 1500 150 780 4 
1954-55 3598 3392 38,241 1500 115 - 351 
1955-56 3656 3528 44,068 1200 180 21+05 146 
1956-57 3869 3790 42,134 1500 3729 310 
1957-58 3975 3794 45,611 1440 2337 288 
1958-59 4404 3736 51 ,240 2000 5985 2167 
1959-60 4456 3736 56 ,521 2000 5805 1998 
1960-61 4529 3724 53,960 2000 4869 1300 
1961-62 4485 3668 60,205 1800 8138 3205 
1962-63 4445 3616 .;;8,278 1800 5575 11184 
1963-64 9391 4209 
Post-development 
4450 3620 60,000 1500 11089 6056 
steers will probably- always be necessary; the present good profits 
to be made from buying and selling of young stock cantiot beassu.ed 
to continue forever. 
Only casual labour for scrub cutting and fence repairs 
was hired until 1955/56, when a permanent man was taken on, 
resident in the new cottage. For a time after this, the cost 
of casual labour was reduced, but with the continuing rise in 
stock numbers, casuals had to be employed again for scrub and 
fence work. 
The situation following development is taken to be the stock 
policy and numbers as above, with one permanent man doing additional 
maintenance work, with casual workers in the shearing shed and for 
odd scrub maintenance work. 150 tons of super-phosphate is neces-
sary to maintain the stock numbers, with occasional scrub cutting 
in conjunction with good cattle grazing management for control. 
Profitability of Development: 
Concept 
Real Pre-Tax 
Real Post-Tax 
Money Pre-Tax 
CASE B, 
Present Worth 
of Surplus 
£ 
£18,733 
2,215 
23,933 
Present Worth 
of Deficit 
£ 
£27,867 
14,997 
22,666 
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Ratio of Present 
Worths 
Although this developmant programme has followed orthodox 
procedures and progressed steadily, with nearly maxim~m feasible 
stock increases, the profitability of the method in real terms, 
after tax, is only marginal, The programme is much more 
expensive than Case A, yet achieves only similar rates of stock 
increase over the same period. 
In this case, taxation is a major factor. The absolute 
stock numbers before development were high, and labour charges 
low. But the incidence of high taxation at the end of the 
development reduces the capitalised value of the post-tax 
additional surplus by an amount more than sufficient to offset 
the pre-development tax payment, and their effects on additional 
surplus during the development. In other words, the profitabil-
ity of this programme has been adversely affected by the fact 
that pre-development profits were high themselves, 
Further, the absolute levels of the three present values 
are little indication of the comparative profitability of the 
development with Case A. Relative to the total cost of devel-
opment, they are only modest. The nation benefited and will 
benefit if similar programmes are carried out on other already 
"economic" properties. Bu t the farmer considering undertaking 
such a programme would be wise to think very deeply about how 
far he should go, and at what rate. There is every likelihood 
that a more modest development expenditure, on the same annual 
area, but with an accelerated stock increase programme would 
be more beneficial. The problem of labour could arise. 
Examples of one man successful lambing 2,~ ewes do exist, and 
in Case B type developments this is probably a more profitable 
strategy. 
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Conclusions 
While profitable for the years in which this programme was 
operated, todays cost and price structure in agriculture suggests 
that the_programme be: 
(a) accelerated in regard to stock increases, 
(b) examined at the technical level for cheaper methods 
of fertility increase~ 
(c) investigated for alternative methods of achieving 
higher stock increases (e.g, wethers on back 
blocks; set stocked Perendale ewes on a portion 
of the property.) 
The very heavy expenditure on fencing maintenance and 
renewal was no doubt justified in the minds of the owners. But 
much of the fencing in the first five years was designed to better 
confine the existing stock than cater for increased stock in new 
areas. A more profitable strategy might have he en to fence the 
new areas first and undertake existing f<'lnce renewal later as 
opportunity allows, Further the owners initially stockpiled 
an enormous amount of fencing material which was not used for 
five and six years. This is unprofitable since the delaying of 
these purchases until they can be used productively is clearly 
advantageous if discounting over time is considered. 
The building of a permanent man' s ,house at £3,500 cannot 
be criticised, since no money was spent on the owners' dwellings 
over the period of development. But as noted above, the labour 
input may haveb<'len high<'lr than necessary in any ,,·ase. 
Overall, the impression gained from this case is one of 
e.nergetic, skilled management, less profitable today than it 
might be if some of the lessons from places like Te ~wa were 
applied, But the physical achievements and dedication are a 
tribute to the owners, and their advisero Since very many 
similar programmes must be applied to much hill cou~try in the 
North Island, the old approach to rate of increase much be 
reconsidered if development is to be really wo~thwhile to the 
farmer 0 
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CASE C. 
General: Although not a development involving scrub cutting, the 
programme on this 1630 acre property was complicated by a strong 
reversion tendency. About 150 acres only was ploughable and 
had been sown to good pasture before the main development started. 
Another 1000 acres had been surface sown in subterranean clovers 
and grass sometime previously. Little evidence of this remained, 
danthonia and hrowntop having taken over, followed by patchy scrub 
and fern. The soils are a sandy clay, and clay over hard rock. 
Strong westerly winds., with occasional frosts and a 52" rainfall, 
coupled with the very hroken aspect, made the whole place very 
difficult to work. 
It is 4 miles from a railway station, 21 miles from 
and 26 miles from Hamilton, and isolated for schooling. 
house for the failiily, and a new non-electric cottage for 
ent labour made up for some of the isolat.icn. 
the works 
A good 
perman-
All 28 paddocks were well supplied with creek water at the 
start of development. Small erosion slips were in evidence. 
Some blackberry in gullies added to the generally unattTactive 
nature of the farm. 
At the start of the development period (1951/52) the owner 
was aged about 40, with several school-age children. On a 
gGvernment capital value of £9000 (1942 hasis), mortgages (£7500), 
private loans' (£3500) and hank overdraft (£1,500) seemed excessive. 
During development the overdraft reached £6000 in 1957/58. 
Management Before Development: Before development commenced (i.e. 
before aerial topdressing became possible), a stock of 1450 
breeding ewes, 500 ewe lambs, plus normal rams and killers could 
be maintained with an average of 50 tons of super-phosphate per 
year, Together with 130 breeding cows (all st€ers kept to at 
least 2~ years old, and all heifers retained except a few culls), 
this stocking was sufficient to keep scrub and fern reversion 
under controlo 
Stock losses were continually high, All wether lambs 
were sold shorn, as were the few cull ewe lambs. 
The annual repairs bill on fences was substantial, One 
permanent married man was resident in thp cottage and occasional 
casual labour was employed, By present day standards this 
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labour force would appear to have been out of proportion to the 
stock carried, or t@ the development programme contemplatedo 
The Development Programme: The method was the orthodox topdressing 
and oversowing, with fence renewal, bulldozing and tracking, and 
building repairs. Most of the work was done by contract. 
Topdressing was immediately stepped up to 100 tons in the 
first year and 130 tons in the second. It continued at approx-
imately these levels to the extent that available finance 
permitted. Subterranean clover was included in the dressing 
every year on a "spreading the risk" principle. Occasionally 
only 2 ozs. per acre was applied, although in the first 5 years 
the whole place had been oVersown with a mixture of sub. ,clover, 
white clover and trefoil. No heavy initial topdressing was 
applied, the general rate of 2 cwt. per acre being used through-
out the programme. 
Up to 20 aCres of hay was made each year, the paddock 
occasionally getting a dressing of sulphate of ammonia when 
closing-up. 
In the first five years the only repair work carried out 
was on fencing, but this did proceed to the limit of available 
finance. Then in 1955/56, in addition to substantial new fencing 
material purchased, the woolshed was rebuilt to a 3 stand raised 
platform type, using iron from the old building. This job cost 
£1000, plus £250 for labour, In the same year, an exc~llent 
double ended airstrip was constracted and grassed for £420. 
This lowered the application charges for fertiliser by 33/-
per ton, In the next year this type of improvement work WClS 
continued, but slowed towards the end of the development period, 
Stock increases were, however, quite low (see table VIII), 
This was partly due to a drought in the third and fourth years 
which necessitated considerable unloading of both cattle and 
sheep, including breeding stocko Thus, in 1954/55, after a 
rise in breeding ewes, they fell to 1350 and breeding cows 
declined to 100. Subse1uent recovery, including the foregoing 
of usually profitable two tooth ewe and old cow sales was slow, 
Following a much increased topdressing programme, the drought 
had a disastrous effect on profitability, Over the whole 
period, breeding ewes increased by about 2% per year and 
breeding cows by 202%, but the wool clip more than kept pace 
with sheep increases, averaging a 3% rise per year, Even 
after the drought years the rate of increase of breeding ewes 
was only 4%, although some hesitation is understandable, 
TABLE VIn 
Year Sheep Cattle 
Pre-development 
1800 1606 
1951-52 1975 1570 
1952-53 1942 1654 
1953-54 1937 1740 
1954-55 1670 1236 
1955-56 1775 1196 
1956-57 1906 1292 
1957-58 1937 1350 
1958-59 2039 1374 
1959-60 2169 1462 
1960-61 1989 1650 
1861-62 2150 1718 
1962-63 2139 1590 
Post-development 
2225 1590 
CASE STUDY Co 
TID Wool 
500 17,500 
1000 18,182 
1300 19,661 
1250 19,259 
652 17,198 
1000 16,878 
1121 17,462 
1400 16,503 
640 18,352 
1000 20,470 
1110 24,790 
1090 22,150 
920 24,804 
800 24,000 
Real 
Surplus 
pre-tax 
(£) 
1939 
-1311 
1628 
--651 
451 
- 128 
517 
583 
1502 
2310 
1091 
1325 
3072 
3472 
Est, Tax 
(,on real 
Surplus 
(£) 
350 
75 
27 
273 
30 
56 
634 
1000 
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The owner considers he can now carry 1800 ewes and replace-
ments, plus 170 breeding cows comfortably although male cattle 
progeny are quitted earlier than-cDreviouslyo Fat lambs, he feels, 
are not worth the trouble arid few young female sheep are· sold, 
the bulk going into the flock since losses are still very higho 
If these sheep are mob stocked (although salmonella is a threat) no 
maintenance in the form of scrub-cutting is requiredo 80 tons 
of serpentine super would be necessary to maintain this situationo 
The biggest problem now is the raising of wint·er carrying capacity 
sufficiently to allow mob grazing and control of three 100 acre 
paddocks, not subdivided and unlikely to be in the fixture 0 
The owner alsb_,feels that with sons home in the holidays, one 
married man plus himself can cope with the work on the increased 
stocko Labour inputs thus remain at the same level as in the 
pre-development situationo 
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Profitability of Development: 
Concept 
Real Pre~Tax 
Real Post-Tax 
Money Pre-Tax 
CASE C. 
Present Worth 
of Surplus 
£ 
£2,,064 
~ 791 
2,761 
Present Worth 
of Deficit 
£ 
£11,216 
8,792 
10,710 
Ratio of Present 
Worths 
0.20 
-0.09 
0.26 
The cautioGUS rate of stock i~cr:eases, in associaticn with 
the almost violent sustained increase in topdressing have been 
partly responsible for low present value-s of the development 
programme. 
While the drought must have left a lasting impression in 
the farmer's mind, there is no evidence that stock cauction 
was matched by equal caukion in other ways. Although the 
problem of pasture control on improved areas in the spring and 
autumn must have occurred fairly early, little attempt was 
made to integrate the fencing and topdressing programmes in 
order to achieve better control. A change in stock carried 
away from breeding ewes towards the more hardy two tooth 
wethers would also have helped the problem. A big increase 
in these, at the expense of breeding flock increases, could 
well have resulted in better control, higher wool sales, and 
very likely lower overall stock losses. 
The present values given above could well overstate the 
real profitability, since labour charges have remained static 
from the pre-development level. Thus, the pre-development 
budget contains a labour charge which on very many farms would 
be much lower. If part of this charge was removed, the 
pre-development surplus would be higher and the added surpluses 
lawer, leading to a lowe·r present value. 
Conclusions 
The nature of the country in1l<!>lved in this case is less produc-
tive than in either case A or B, Nevertheless, the possib'le 
stock increases under the topdressing programme should be 
higher, Thus, better strategies would be:-
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(a) Slow down topdressing programme (to a piecemeal approach, 
with perhaps a heavier initial application?)o 
(b) A more flexible stock policy to allow easier managment 
in dry yearso 
(c) A higher rate of stock increase with less emphasis 
on winter feeding, partly achieved by the introduction 
of a wether flock, at least until total stock numbers 
and fertility had been increased to a two-man level, 
(c) More concentration on stock control by fencing, thus 
further reducing the need to carry heavier stocking 
through the winter to enable high numbers to be mob 
stocked on large paddocks, 
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CASE D. 
General: 
On the main road a few miles north of Ongarue, Taumarunui, 
this 510 acre steep hill county property was taken over in 1949, 
through the Rehabilitation Scheme by a man with substantial 
local knowledge, Aged about 30 with a young family, the owner 
decided to implement a topdressing, overs owing and increased 
stocking policy, using income as the source of finance, 
Before this development programme got under way, 20 acres 
out of a possible 100 acres of rolling deep sandy clays with 
papa outcrops had been sown to grass. The other 410 acres was 
steep sandy pumice loam over sandstone, No bush and only small 
areas of scattered scrub and fern made the development programme 
relatively straight forward. The farm was subdivided into 
14 paddocks, including one large block of 150 acres. 
Sufficient stock water was available from creeks and 
springs, and the house and yards were watered from a piped 
spring. Erosion tendencies on the papa outcrop gave no trouble 
in later years, under topdressing and stockcmanagemeilt. The 
local Rabbit Board did a good job in controlling a bad infest-
ation over the first 4 or 5 years of possession. Little 
planted shelter was available except around the homestead. 
The property is an open basin, tending easterly, running 
up to 1500'. Long, fairly severe winters coupled with 70 
inch rainfall, are typical of the area, 
Little information is available on the owner's equity. at 
the start of development, but it may be surmised that this was 
quite low leading to decision to develop ~out of income". A 
substantial mortgage must have been used to obtain possession. 
and even in 1958/59 the mortgage was still over £4,000. 
Management before Development: 
Following rehabilitation settlement, this property was 
capable of carrying 700 ewes, 370 ewe hoggets, plus killers 
and about 30 rams. Sales of wether lambs included 200 fat 
and 100 store, all ewe lambs were ~arried through the winter 
and those surplus to requirements sold as two tooth ewes the 
next year" Some similar properties in the district were 
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selling all surplus lambs fat at this stage. 
33 breeding cows (black and white) could be carried normally 
with all steers held until 4 years old and then sold in forward 
store or fat conditiono 
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grazing 
checko 
his own. 
tons of superphosphate, 2 weeks scrubcutting and good 
management would have kept scrub and fern patches in 
The owner could thus have maneged almost entirely on 
The Development Programme: 
This was a simple accelerated topdressing and oversowing 
programme (see Table IX), with some cultivation for crop and 
new grass on the easier country. The actual topdressing was 
not much greater each year during the development programme, 
than the predevelopment level of 45 tons total. The bulk of 
the increased expenditure went into new fences, the renewal 
of poor boundary and internal ~ences and buildings and tracks, 
The first year saw £140 spent on the part share of a new air-
strip. In the second year, a new electric shearing plant. 
The next year a BristoL crawler tractor with trailer and 
harrows was bought for £1250. From then on, the principal 
work was fencing and building. 
The rest of the development was "hidden" in that the 
removal of hard fern, by burning and oversowing; the control 
of a bidi-bidi problem by grazing; and finally the eradication 
of a heavy rabbit population by the Rabbit Board, all proceeded 
as part of the normal farm programme. Good everyday management 
enabled this farmer to clean his property up with little 
"development costs" as such. The rebuilding and fencing 
process went on right up to the end of the programme; an 
electric bore and pump were installed; a portable spray purchased; 
an extra stand on the woolshed and other items. These costs 
were little more than normal farm expenditure, and were possibly 
excessive. The owner consistently got over 100% lambing with 
no innoculations or urenches, except towards the end of the 
programme, an indication of the high level of managemento 
Following development, breeding ewes had settled down to 
920. The farmer had little intention of going further, due to 
ill-health. Breeding cows had increased to 65, selling 2~ 
year fat steers and surplus heifer calves as vealerso Herd 
replacements were provided crossing Polled Angus cows with a 
Polled Angus bull, and selling only the steers. The balance 
40 
TABLE IX CASE STUDY D. 
Year Sheep Cattle T/D N/G Wool Real Est. Tax 
Surplus on real 
pre-tax Surplus 
(EE) (EE) (ac.) (ae .) (lb. ) (£) (£) 
Pre-development 
905 475 400 11,700 2449 199 
1955-56 935 552 200 12,563 789 47 
1956-57 935 636 500 6 14,771 1621 226 
1957-58 995 552 500 14,186 600 
1958-59 1031 594 420 1G 15,082 1213 127 
1959-60 1081 720 480 15,048 1200 121 
1960-6:1 1140 678 400 16,315 1904 205 
1961-62 1179 722 240 8 18,734 3102 678 
1962-63 1209 766 400 19,1121 2459 375 
Post-development 
1200 760 480 18,000 3240 458 
of the eowswere put to a Hereford bull, the heifers sold 
immediately and the steers kept till 4 years old, to provide 
heavy grazing where required. 
The owner, (plus(normal casual labour) worked the property 
comfortably, until the 5th year, when a permanent man was taken 
for the next 3i years. The labour used in the post-development 
period is the owner plus bis son, in normal cases a little 
excesej;:ve,.but with the owners illness, quite justified here. 
Profitability of Development: 
CASE D. 
Concept 
ll1eal Pre-Tax 
Real Post-Tax 
Money Pre~Tax 
Present Worth 
of Surplus 
£ 
£2,559 
- 179 
4,194 
Present Worth 
of Deficit 
£ 
£6,151 
5,858 
5,631 
Ratio of Present 
Worths 
0.42 
-0.03 
0.,74 
If followed today, the extensive rebuilding and fencing 
programme, plus the full time additional labour unit, would 
require a higher rate of stock increase than occurred. 
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Even in actual terms, the nation received little from the 
programme, in terms of additional productivity. 
Conclusions 
This rather unusual case of development points up the folly 
of "modernising" the property without "modernising" the stock. 
Granted the stock management was excellent, but in its undevel-
oped state this property could nowadays hardly support the 
family, let alone provide income for the rebuilding programme. 
It appears that no additional finance was borrowed, other than 
for seasonal purposes, although at the end of the period the 
owner'S book capital account was declining steadily. 
The lessons to be learnt from this case are:-
On the credit side, 
(a) Good stock increases can be achieved with no 
additional fertiliser, simply by intelligent 
grazing management. 
(b) If no extra labour had been necessary, even this 
moderate stock increase could have been profitable. 
On the debit side. 
(a) The rather old fasilioned ideas on labour requirements 
almost certainly would cause this programme to be 
unprofitabl~. At 920 ewes now, the property should 
be a one man unit. 
(N.B. the indisposition of the owner in this particular 
case 0 ) 
(b) The final stocking rate of 3,8 E.B, per acre is low 
in relation to the potential. Even a moderate 
4.5 EE/ac., achieved in the same period would make 
this programme worthwhile. 
(c) Almost certainly the 60 ton rate of topdressing is 
unnecessary to maintain the 3.8 B,B. per acre. 
Thus the conclusions are that this development programme would 
be wasteful of labour, and of capital in new buildings and fences, 
and of fertiliser, unless the stocking rate increases had been 
faster. 
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CASE E. 
General: Literally on the edge of civilization hard up against the 
Rangitikei Gorge and the Ruahine Ranges, this 630 acre light hill 
country (with a strong ash shower influence) does not quite fit in 
the low rainfall category. 50-55", at 2000' to 2200' is much 
damper than the same rainfall at lower, warmer altitudes. 
Although generally lying to the west, the property is broken 
and steep, with some easier tops. 90 acres of rolling sandstone-
based medium light sandy loam has undergone some cultivation. 
The remaining 540 acres is limestone based, and unploughable. 
At the start of development, internal access, even to 
buildings was very poor. Taken up with Rehabilitation finance 
the property was very much a one man unit, requiring some courage 
to live on and work. Streams, springs, and 2 dams provided 
adequate water. In common with much of this. unusually steep 
hill country, little trouble was experienced from erosion. 
Throughout the development period, only casual labour 
(about 2 months per year) has been hired, and this mostly for 
fencing and scrub cutting. Some reciprocal labour was available 
at times from relatives in the district. 
No shearing shed, and a rather poor home and garage 
presented the owner with a big building job during the develop-
ment. Aged about 30 at takeover, the owner had a £6,000 
mortgage, and the use of a bank credit of about £1,200. 
During development no more finance was raised except for a 
rise in overdraft to £4,000 in 1955/56, and the mortgage 
progressively lessened to £4,000 in 1962/53. 
Management before Development: The property was stocked with 750 
Romney ewes, selling all wether lambs in store condition, about 
30 per cent of the ewe lambs, and 5 year old ewes. Pre-develop-
ment wool clip has been assessed at 90101bs. 
About 25 breeding cows were carried, but the herd was 
supplemented by buy~ng-in. Principa~ sales were store-forward 
bullocks to the yards. Cattle were sold off from time to time 
when finance was required for development. 
10 tons of super phosphate per year would have maintained 
the 700 ewe carrying capacity. The owner felt that this intensity 
of stocking and topdressing would have kept the scattered scrub 
in check, At the start of development there were 8 paddocks, 
including ona of 124 acres. 
The Development Process: In general, the process has been a gradually 
accelerated nibbling away at scattered scrub, together with some 
cUltivation of easier country. Topdressing applied has been 
erratic, controlled by finance and some difficulty in getting 
fertiliser to the property. Eradication of scrub by spraying 
was tried in 1958/59 but was a failure, and not repeated. 
Fencing, both new and maintenance, proceeded slowly at 
first, but accelerated from 1958/59 onwards, until in 1963/64 
there were 20 paddocks. Most of the heavier scrub work was 
done using hired labour, a total of 62 weeks during the whole 
period, although some of this labour was used on fence renewal 
towards the end of development. 
In the spring of 1958/59 a limited cultivation programme 
was started when 7 acres was sown to swedes for the 1960 winter, 
This was grassed in 1960/61 and a further 7 acres sown to swedes 
and chou moellieI', The crops and new grass received 3 cwt. of 
super, against the normal 2 cwt. on grassland topdressed. This 
7 acres was again cropped in 1961/62, together with 9 acres from 
old grass, 6 sown to greenfeed barley and 3 to swedes and 
chow moell:l:er, thus a two crop system of grassing was found 
necessary on this lighter type of hill country. 
For this relatively minor amount of cropping (and, of 
course, some tracking) an £1,100 crawler (1959) tractor plus 
implements, was purchased, in addition to a small diesel wheel 
tractor purchased earlier. 
In 1957/58 a woolshed was started and completed the next 
year for a total cost of £2,500 including building labour. In 
1959/60 some levelling and dam clearing by contract was done. 
As can be seen from the table the overall increase in 
carrying capacity and productien was hardly spectacular. Granted 
the peorness of the seil, the climate and the terrain, it seems 
the eriginal 700 ewes were carried reasonably successfully on a 
lower plane of feeding than the present level ef 830 ewes, 
preducing 12,8001bso of wooL Some fattening is pessible, abeut 
150 wether lambs, Surplus female replacement stock is still 
sold as ewe hoggets, although present day prices would suggest 
that this may be an unprofitable method of dispesal, 
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TABLE X CASE STUDY E, 
Year Sheep Cattle T/D N/G Wool Real Est~ Tax 
Surplus on real 
pre-tax Surplus 
(EE) (EE) (ac , ) (ac ,) (lb, ) (£) (£) 
Pre-developmenl: 
670 350 70 9010 1649 249 
1950-51 NA NA NA NA 1578 160 
1951-52 866 NA 150 8716 -626 
1952-53 938 376 NA NA -815 
1953-54 955 330 NA 9389 1123 64 
1954-55 945 686 200 9340 539 9 
1955-56 900 506 120 8620 374 1 
1956-57 943 466 NA NA 2127 154 
1957-58 950 414 200 10475 2241 331 
1958-59 984 430 100 11474 271 
1959-60 997 406 10834 1383 86 
1660-61 1050 452 150 7 12425 428 
1961-62 1048 360 200 11516 1290 50 
1962-63 1071 452 200 7 13334 1383 86 
Post-development 
1050 405 150 12775 2314 478 
Cattle have risen to a steady 35 cows, selling half the 
progeny as weaners and the ball.ance, other than replacement 
heifers, sold asyearling or 2 year olds, 
An unforeseen result of the low stock increase is the 
necessity to put on somewhat more than 20 tons of super 
phosphate, and cut about 4 acres of scrub per year in order 
to maintain fertility, While it cannot be suggested that 
Te Awa and other results will apply on this class of country, 
a somewhat higher final stocking rate would probably keep the 
scrub in check, as well as reducing the need for fertiliser 
to maintain fertility, 
Profitability of Development: CASE E. 
Concept 
Real Pre-Tax 
Real Post-Tax 
Money Pre-Tax 
Present Worth 
of Surplus 
£ 
-£2,330 
2,54 7 
3,364 
Present Worth 
of DeHci t 
£ 
£8,215 
6,672 
5,186 
Ratio of Present 
Worths 
-0.28 
-0.38 
0.64 
Predictably, the returns achieved are not very great. The 
Present values in each of the three situations reflect quite 
clearly the failure of stocking rate to increase faster. It 
could well be that this country's stock potential under normal 
development methods is not very high, in which case, some 
reappraisal of its continued development may be necessary. 
Conclusions 
In the absence of a clearer idea of the maximum carrying 
capacity of this class of hill country follpwing the development 
methods described it is difficult to tell whether the low present 
values are due to poor stock increases or a result of the 
country's inability to cope with the stock. 
Whatever the true situation it is possible that this process 
would have been profitable if: 
or 
or 
(a) No croJ"ping had been done, (this alone should have 
allowed at least another 50 ewes following sowing 
down) , 
(c) 
No implements had been purchased 
Stock had been increased as extra feed had become 
available during the early scrub cutting programme. 
The 700 ewes could possibly have been run by the owner with-
out having recourse to hired labour for scrub cutting or fence 
maintenance. 
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SECTION 2:: Steep Hill Country with Lower Rainfall. 
CASE F.. 
qeneral: In Castlepoint county,' 30 miles from Hasterton, this 1806 
acre property has a wet winter;. wi th strong westerly winds, but a 
mild dry summer. A total of only 35" of poorly spread rainfall 
combines with the strong winds to make farming in the area part-
icul~rly susceptible to drought conditions. Nevertheless, the 
intensive development programme followed by the owner over 12 
years is an example of what can be done with this dry coastal -
Wairarapa hill country, although the property did not reach 
anything like its potential production over the period. 
The property is mostly north and east facing. 90 acres 
of poorly drained heavy silty c.lay loam carried good ryegrass 
and white clover pasture at t4~ start of development. Of 
the balance about one half (975 acres) was ploughable silty 
clay loam, partly on sandstone and partly on mudstone. The 
mudstone carried a cover of browntop and danthonia while the 
sandstonB was more mixed with browntop, danthonia, gorse and 
heather. 
The remaining 770 acres was steep light clay loam over 
sandstone, carried 120 acres of scrub, and was in poor heart 
with danthonia, browntop, heather and gorse competing with 
further scrub reversion. 
The initial picture is one of some wet flats, 400 acres 
of reasonably mudstone and ',300 acres poor reverted sandstone 
country. Thirty dams plus permanent springs supplied adequate 
water. Some fairly serious slipping had occurred on restricted 
areas and wind erosion was occurring on westerly faces of the 
lighter country. 
Gorse was a problem in the district, but was reasonably 
controlled on this property. 
Some occasional flooding of the nats was also a difficulty. 
At the start of development the owners equity was extremely 
high, except for a small overdraft. As development proceeded 
the overdraft reach nearly £15,000 in '959/60, when a mortgage 
of £8,000 was negotiated and bank accommodation also increased. 
In 1962/63 the property Vias subdivided for 
sale, and the development programme was regarded as complete. 
• Case B. in Publication No. 14, A.E.R.D • 
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Management before Development: Prior to development 1,200 breeding 
ewes, 500 evie hoggets, 50 wethers and 25 rams were carried, to-
gether with 112 breeding cows and 33 overwintered young cattle 
(for sale as yearlings), At this level the property was 
rapidly reverting to scrub. vii. th no topdressing at all, The 
pre-development budget has been calculated with no fertiliser 
charges, but with an annual scrub cutting bill of £420. 
16,oOOlb, of wool was being sold and the bulk of the wether 
lambs not retained were fattened to about 301b. Two thirds 
of the surplus ewe lambs were sold, the balance being wintered 
and culled for sale as two tooth ewes, 
The labour situation was a little on the expensive side, 
with 2 youths employed in addition; to casual scrub cutting, 
giving a total wages bill of about £1,432 (including shearing 
and crutching), 
About 10 acres of swedes and chou moellier was grown 
annually and occasionally rape, giving a new grass area of 
10 acres each year. This was not part of the hill development 
programme, the cropping being substantially stepped up when 
devabpment began. 
The Development Process: Table XI gives an indication of the 
levels of cropping and topdressing used in this development 
programme. A small portion of the early development 
cultivation was on the wet flats, and included a crop of 
peas. 
The steep unploughable country was regularly topdressed 
at 2 cwt. every second year and the ploughable country with 
2 cwt, every year, Gnce the new grass was established. The 
new grass was generally sown following 2 crops of swedes 
and chou moellier, one area at the start having had a poor 
new grass strike following one root crop only. Occasionally 
(2 years) a black barley greenfeed crop was substituted for 
the second ~opo Turnips, too, were used twice instead of 
swedes. One year a soft turnip summer crop was tried 
(12 acres) followed by greenfeed crop, The crop areas always 
received 2 cwt. super phosphate per acre, 
In 1954/55 liming of new grass areas commenced, at 1 ton 
per acre around sowing, In some later years, aerial liming 
of established grassland was practised, up to 75 tons per year 
(see Table XI). 
All the cultivation was done with the owner's equipment, 
which included a crawler tractor and full range of implements. 
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TABLE XI CIISE STUDY F. 
Year Sheep Cattle T/D N/G Wool Real Est. Tax 
Surplus on real 
pre-tax Surplus 
(EE) (EE) (ao • ) (ao .) (lb .) (£) (£) 
Pre-development 
1500 748 16,050 2841 678 
1950-51 2498 508 
1951-52 1470 660 300 17,437 -2589 
1952-53 1730 1028 12,776 -3266 
1953-54 1815 1106 12 NA -1278 
1954-55 1800 1104 300 17.675 - 585 
1955-56 1677 123.4 600 98 NA - 205 
1956-57 2212 1076 600 40 23,434 2354 127 
1957-58 2539 1224 640 55 NA -1969 
1958-59 2850 978 672 48 30,395 680 
1959-60 3255 1198 600 83 43,546 - 530 
1960-61 3699 1074 675 75 35,392 1+947 868 
1961-62 4077 1210 600 80 46,109 1+704 918 
1962-63 4167 796 600 60 49,137 -,613 
Post-development 
3990 930 700 60 49,000 7053 3332 
Some casual labour was hired at the start of the period, but 
the bulk of the labour supply was permanent, using from 2 men 
in 1950/51 to 3 men in 1954/55 B.nd 4 men in 1961/62, besides 
the owner. r·luch scrub cutting labour was htred, however, 
towards the end of the development but most of the fencing 
repairs were done by the permanent labour. Most of the 
present subdivision fencing had been done before the start 
of the development programme under study. 
In 1951/52, married accommodation costing £3,000 was 
erected, the balance 6f the permanent labour being young 
men, ahda Rural Field Cadet in some years. 
A severe drought in 1958/59 had to be met through a 
reduction in cattle numbers, but breeding ewes increased from 
1,200 to 3,300 at the end of the development, before disposal 
of part of the property. Wool had risen to 49,OOOlbs. Fat 
wether lamb sales were proportionately lower than in the pre-
development situation, however. 
Breeding cows had steadily increased from 112 to 130, all 
progeny not required as replacements being sold as yearlings, 
This programme, aimed initially at controlling scrub by 
methods other than continual cutting, has proceeded steadily 
and systematically towards a high carrying capacity of nearly 
3 ewe equivalents per acre with both the easy and the hard 
country being improved together. It is similar to case B, 
Profitability of Development: 
Concept 
Real Pre-Tax 
Real Post-Tax 
Money Pre-Tax 
CASE Fo 
Present Worth 
of Surplus 
• 
£ 
£8,571 
-7,642 
15,043 
Present Worth 
of Deficit 
£ 
£26,276 
21,674 
20,306 
Ratio of Present 
Worths 
The reward for such a large programme has not been high 
for this farmer, In rea1 terms development expenditure is 
only just covered by the capitalisation of the post-development 
surplus. The property suffered a clover loss problem, probably 
influenced by the drought, but likely to mirror the same 
problem found further north, in Wairoa. The big factor at 
the start of development was, according to the owner, getting 
the scrub under control some way other than continual cutting. 
The very substantial 2 crop development method grassed 650 . 
acres of the 900 ploughable. SufficientlY good techniques of 
scrub control by cutting, liming, heavy topdressing and good 
seed mixtures may have done the job as thoroughly, although 
somewhat slowly. 
Also, the high labour charges are certainly a factor in 
lowering profitability. With little doubt the same programme 
today could be accomplished with much less l"lbour, a one crop 
system and heavier initial topdressing, 
The programme itself j.s a credit to the owner, who did follow 
the rules existing at the time. He could well have been dis-
couraged by his tax situation. The improved techniques coupled 
with higher labour efficiencies available today would probably 
raise the real post-tax present worth to higher levels, 
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Conclusions 
This case is one which, if quoted out of context could lead 
to some ficticious ideas about Wairarapa hill country development. 
In the years it was done, it was profitable, without a doubt. 
The farmer benefited, as did the nation, from a vigorously 
implemented and controlled programme. Inefficiencies apparent 
only nowadays would, if rectified make this farm a model for 
development of much of that class of country. 
51 
CASE G,· 
General, The development programme completed on this property in 
1962/63 is sufficiently unusual to warrant closer study than 
some of the others, The 1,050 acre property, of steep coastal 
hill country has only 15 acres of heavy silty clay loam, the 
balance being all steep, There are 390 acres of medium clay 
loam of sandstone and papa, and 645 acres of light clay on 
sa*dstone, At the start of the development the pasture was 
uniformly browntop and danthonia with some suckling and 
other volunteer clovers, A continuous reversion to Hanuka 
was taking place and the steep medium clays carried some 
Tauhinu, (Senecio cassinioides,) 
A low rainfall of 35 inches combined with a ·mlld winter 
and good spring to produce a plBasant climatBmarred only 
by strong westerly winds, Coastal influence is therefore 
strong, The property rises from 300 to 900 feet lying 
southwest and northeast, 
The father of the present owner had spent a large part 
of his: life cutting scrub, with little or no topdressing, 
This method failed to reduce the infestation, and the present 
development programme was launched, Thus the property had 
in effect been static for a large number of years, just 
holding its own against manuka reversion, Stock water 
supply occasionally ran short, relying as it did on spring 
and streams~ but was never a cause for undue worryo Erosion 
was no threat, apart from the Manuka and Tauhinu, 
Total fencing at the start of the development was only 
785 chains, including 380 chains of boundary, The standard 
of subdivision was lowo Early in the programme the owner set 
up a fence-post treatment plant using timber cut on the 
property, His costings indicated a gross saving of £100 per 
mile on development fencing during the developmento 
In 1950/51, the property was debt-free with a wool 
retention fund of £2,300 and no overdraft, 
Management before Development: 700 Romney ewes were carried, with 
replacements bred on the property, 260 ewe hoggets, 200 wether 
hoggets and 25 Romney rams were wintered, The surplus two-tooth 
ewes were culled out in January, and the two-tooth wethers not 
required for killers sold off-shears in November, About 90 tail-
end wether lambs were sold as stores before the wintero 
• Case A in Publication No, 14, A,EoR,Uo 
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No breeding cows were wintered, the steers 
yearlings or weaners depending on the season. 
sold as 18 month or 2 year olds. 
being sold as 
Heifers were 
This stock policy could have been maintained with no 
topdressing, hay or supplementary crop, in the owner's opinion, 
but a rather high annual charge for scrub control of £150 (i owner, i hired labour) would have been necessary. 
Al though probably unnecess,',ry, a man was hired for 6 
months of the year, in addition to the scrub cutting labour. 
The property is 30 miles from Masterton. 
The Development Programme, The programme on this farm proceeded 
in two distinct phases. In contrast to case B whiCh stock piled 
fencing material (and the profitability of which was adversely 
affected by lack of early subdivision,) this case spent the first 
four years contructing fences, with little increase in stock 
numbers until pRsture improvement was started. Again the 
effect was detrimental. 
Stock increases generally were not startling and any move-
ment in stock numbers in the first part of the programme was 
not accompanied by increases in wool production. This was 
probably in part due to lack of fertilizer, and partly to low 
rainfall which culminated in a dreught in 1954/55. Furthermore, 
the practise of selling off-shears two-tooth wethers in 
November ceased very early in the development which contributed 
to the decline in wool production. 
A further reason for the slow increase in stock numbers was 
a number of changes in the farm's financial organisation. At 
the start of the development, in 1950/51, the owner took over 
the running of the property from his father. The financial 
implications of the takeover required a high level of off-farm 
outgoings and maximum sales of stock consistent with normal 
replacement policyo Again, in 1954/55, a father/son partner-
ship was formed, and this move coincided with arurought. Again, 
in 1959/60 the present owner took over complete control, the 
partnership being dissolved, 
Throughout the programme the weather played a dominant 
role in limiting effective utilisation of improved fe~tility. 
The drought of 1954/55 caused the abandonment of the my flock. 
In 1956/57 a very dry late autumn 8eared the sunny faces 
(aggravated by severe army worm infestations) and these had 
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to be oversown with ryegrass and clovers in the iAutumn of 1957. 
Cattle, too, were sold, both steers (as weaners) and, unfortun~ 
ately, breeding cows (the breeding herd was halved.) Attractive 
cattle prices assisted this decision. 
The improvement pl'ogramme proceeded in three stages, starting 
with the fencing programme. For 4 years, the poor sUbdiviston 
situation was attacked by the erection of 2i miles of new fence. 
During this period, no topdressing or cultivation was done. 
Fencing proceeded steadily throughout the other development 
phases, a further 5 miles being completed. 
The second stage, commenced in 1954/55, involved topdressing 
(and some oversowing) of the steeper country (see Table XII). 
Rates generally started high, at 3 cwt. per acre, but were reduced 
to 2 cwt. towards the end of this phase. Molybdenum was included 
in most dressings. 
TABLE XII CASE STUDY G. 
Year Sheep Cattle T/D N/G Wool Real Est. Tax 
Surplus on real 
pre-tax Surplus 
(EE) (EE) (ae • ) (ae .) (lb. ) (£) (£) 
flre-development 
1047 350 13,000 2682 622 
1950-51 1110 358 13,660 3082 771 
1951-52 1085 459 14,943 932 72 
1952-53 1266 534 12,297 33 
1953-54 1356 612 12,lf18 473 21 
1954-55 1282 590 100 13,931 16 
1955-56 1195 552 120 9 9,845 905 31 
1956-57 1309 519 180 NA 1598 148 
1957-58 1218 314 100 15,245 1078 102 
1958-59 1311 350 120 5 12,040 734 45 
1959-60 1591 478 104 3 14,878 - 262 
1960-61 1768 546 107 17,997 1358 154 
1961-62 1541 638 250 88 19,346 1809 226 
1962-63 2062 520 398 48 21,442 2175 348 
Post-development 
1950 550 400 24,300 4147 1370 
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The third phase commenced in 1958/59, with the sowing of a 
small block of chou moellier, together with some new grass after 
a summer crop of soft turnips, The following year, the chou 
moellier was sown to grass, The results apparently indicated 
the easisr tops could be cultivated, sown with chou moellier 
for winter feed, and sown the next autumn with new grass, both 
sowings with 2 cwt, of serpentine molybdic super phosphate, 
The Table show.s the extent of this programme, The total cost 
per acre including sowings was £26 using contract machinery, 
The increasing area of winter crop assisted the re-
introduction of the dry flock, which was overw;.ntered using the 
crop and either sold the next summer, or again wintered and 
sold as four-tooth wethers, 
In 1959/60, the effects of a further drought was mitigated 
bS grazing out a number of cattle, a good 1959 spring and 1960 
autumn, ahd the p)lrchase of 7 tons of hay, 
In 1958/59 the farm joined a group labour scheme but made 
limited use of this except at critical periods of the year, for 
only 6 - 8 Weeks, The general picture of labour was complicated 
by the family partnership, Generally the property was run by 
two labour units, with additional group or other casual labour 
for fencing, 
Little additional building was done, A £40 woolshed 
addition, and a whare for £350 were built during the period, 
The final stage of development completed in the review 
period is not the end of the job, The owner contemplates 
further subdivision, increased stock, and an improvement in the 
water supply, Under present COnditions, the farm is expected 
to winter 1,200 ewes, 550 wethers goggets, 500 two-tooth 
wethers, and 450 ewe hoggets, Lambing percentages have been 
low throughout the period, and this has no doubt prompted 
the dry-flock decision, The owner feels the dry sheep will 
better. utilise available feed under mob stocking in the spring, 
At least 2 men are apparently required, which seems excessive 
in view of the dry sheep policyo Wethers will all be sold 
as four-tooths, and the ewe hoggets culled as two-tooths 
selling 2000 
Cow numbers, at 55 breeding cows are to some degree 
reduced by the availability of the milk flock for grazing. 
Steers will be sold as weaners or yearlings, and heifers 
at either 2 or 3 years old, 
On dissolution of the partnerhsip, £11,000 by way of 
1st mortgage was raised by the present owner for purchase of 
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the other share. An examination of the balance sheets suggests 
the programme was done completely out of income, although in real 
terms (1962/63) an overdraft of about £1,500 would be accumulated 
by the 10th year. 
The Profitability of Development: CASE G. 
Gencept Present Worth Present Worth Ratio of Present 
of Suq21us of Deficit Worths 
£ f, 
Hllal Pre~Tax -£2,900 14,724 -0.19 
Heal Post-Tax - 4,614 10,453 -0.44 
Money Pre-Tax 
- 1,394 13,887 -0.10 
To date, then, this programme has been unprofitablBo Over 
the period, aggregate stock numbers have doubled, as has wool 
production. What factors have determined the loss in this case, 
in the face of this satisfactory physical performance? 
First, the stock increases became worth while only in 
1959/60 about the start of the cultivation phase. Presumably 
the availability of additional winter feed, and of new grass 
in the spring gave the owner the c cmfidence needed to hang 
on in droughty summers. A more profitable result would have 
been obtained by providing additional winter and spring feed 
supplies right from the start. 
Second, the disposal of the dry sheep reduced stocking 
rate flexibility. Selling breeding stock in dry years was not 
as profitable as maintaining a lower breeding flock and selling 
easily replaced dry stock. 
Third, the error inherent in fencing without stocking (or 
stocking without fencing) is again demonstrated. 
Fourth, a changed in farm-ownership pattern must be planned 
in advance, so that the change does not work against obtaining 
maximum benefit from previous development. 
Fifthly, droughts; 
as in say, Canterbury, 
in the North Island. 
these must be incorporated in plans, 
and not met head on, as is the tendency 
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Conclusions 
The main lesson to be learnt from this is that each part 
of a development programme must be planned in conjunction with 
all the rest, Admittedly in the days that this programme 
started, the development technique knowledge was lacking, This 
particular farmer had to find his way, 
But by borrowing some money, topdreSSing and increasing 
stock as well as fencing at the start, the job could have been 
a lot more profitable, This property, with no topdressing 
costs before development, was in a reasonably profitable position 
at the start, The increases in stock numbers must take place 
as the fencing and as the topdressing is done, in order to 
provide the necessary finance for development, 
CASE Ho 
General: This 1,200 acre property on Greywacke hills 20 miles 
from Masterton, is interesting because a managerial difficulty 
occurred during development which restricted the rate of stock 
increase. The block is typical of this "Taupo" country of 
which broke~ outcrops occur all the way up the East Coast to 
East Cape. At the start of development it was virtually 
clean of scrub. It was part of a larger property divided 
for rehabilitation settlement, and was taken over by the owner 
using rehabilitation finance. 
Rainfall is 35" - 38", but not well spread. Winter 
and spring are wet and summ€r and autumn dry. The prevail-
ing wind is a strong westerly. 
In 1951, there were 100 acres of medium clay loam on 
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sandy clay, all ploughable, with R cover of browntop, danthonia, 
subterranean, suckling and white clovers, and a little ryegrasso 
The balance of 1,100 acres was steep light clay loam on sandy 
clay and greywacke, with 25 acres of bush, and several gorges. 
Semi-scattered fern was a slight problem in the front 400 acres. 
The water supply came from reliable creeks and streams; there 
was practically no erosion, nor reversion and very little other 
than natural shelter. The owner had a young family and worked 
closely with neighbours. The land and buildings were then 
valued at approximately £18,800 and total liabilities were £14,000, 
principally mortgage finance. 
Management before Development: The property was estimated to be 
carrying 1,100 ewes, 480 ewe hoggets, 240 wether hoggets and 
240 wethers. Sales of wethers would be equal numbers of store 
lambs and two-tooth wethers and all surplus ewe lambs were sold 
as such. In addition 60 breeding cows were kept with all 
surplus young stock sold as yearlings. The sheep would clip 
about 17,OOOlbso of wool. 
The owner, with considerable previous experience on this 
country felt the above aock could have been carried with no 
topdressing of phosphate. In view of the absence of any 
reversion problem, this is probably correcto Before the 
development (actually, improvement) programme started the 
owner felt that one permanent man was a necessity,and this 
has been allowed in the pre-development budget. Throughout 
the programme the labour input has been consistently above 
this figure 0 
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The Development Programme: Commencing in 1951/52 this programme 
built up until 1960/61 when it levelled off. A topdressing 
operation was instituted in which varying amounts of land were 
topdressed and oversown, all in the front, easier, 400 acres. 
At the start 2cwt. of Molybdic super phosphate was applied, 
which apparently caused a copper deficiency and was discontinued. 
Superimposed on this was a basic slag dressing in 3 years, 1957/58, 
1958/59 and 1960/61. This was an attempt to eliminate the 
scattered ferns, and, if slag does have this effect, it was 
successful. 
The managerial problem arose because the owner felt 
that topdressing the whole 1,200 acres would require greater 
stock numbers than the property could safely wint~r. He did 
run a small stud (which has been allowed for at the rate of 
1 stud ewe for 2 flock ewes in the calculations). What hay 
was made or bought was fed to the stud (never more than 180 
ewes). This fear of wintering was, therefore, nothing more 
than an inability to appreciate the values of feed conservation, 
even more serious when at least 100 acres is ploughable, and 
therefore, capable of supporting a greater hay crop than was 
ever. made. 
The balance of the programme was fencing. on which 
£3.500 was spent over the period, again mostly on the front 
country. 
The result has been a very small increase in ewe 
numbers. The owner felt he was justified in holding back 
ewe numbers because he was convinced that better quality 
wool was what both he, and the nation, would need, rather 
than greater quantities of inferior wool. 
TABLE: XIII CASE: STUDY H, 
Year Sheep Cattle T/D Wool Real Est, Tax 
Surplus on real 
pr€-tax Surplus 
(EE) (EE) (ac , ) (lb, ) (£) (£) 
Pre-development 
1460 600 15,440 32:12 860 
1950-51 1412 643 16,,524 4611 1520 
1951-52 1686 784 100 15,000 1978 297 
1952-53 1757 812 120 NA 1948 289 
1953-54 1637 1254 400 NA -257 
1954-55 1661 1142 250 NA 2597 375 
1955-56 1722 1042 250 20,174 1210 45 
1956-57 1850 1292 440 NA 425 
1957-58 1894 946 440 18,145 2496 393 
1$58-59 2062 804 100 NA 3078 65{) 
1959-60 2092 850 21,791 2321 }f6 
1960-61 1998 934 470 18,584 2909 549 
1961-62 1980 1114 19,581 2751 468 
1962-63 1951 1070 22,507 4607 1417 
Post-development 
2010 1050 21,500 4336 1490 
The Post-Development Situation: Following the improvement of the 
front country, 1,350 breeding ewes, (with 150 fat lambs for 
sale, possible), 100 two-tooth wethers, and 100 breeding cows, 
with majority being sold at both the yearling" and rising 2 year 
stages, could be carried, This is not a bad performance when 
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it is considered that the increase is the result of the improve-
ment of only 400 acres, The back 800 acres is however, badly 
understocked in the spring and autumn, and better feed conser-
vation would allow much higher numbers to be wintered, 
Very little contract labour was used during the development, 
and permanent hired labour rose to 3 me1h in 1955/560 This 
has been reduced considerably, until the post-development 
situation is felt to require only one man (a brother of the 
owner), 
The liabilities have been reduced to a £7,000 mor,tgage, 
and a more or less permanent overdraft of between £2,000 and 
£3,0000 
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The Profitability of Development: CASE H. 
Concept Present Worth Present Worth Ratio of Present 
Real Pre-Tax 
Real Post-Tax 
Money Pre-Tax 
Conclusions 
of Surplus 
0 
'" 
£710 
- 878 
3698 
of Deficit Worths 
£ 
£10,046 0,07 
4,87!§ -0,15 
7,639 0,48 
W~ile definitely not a 'failure', this programme has some very 
evident weak spots. These are: 
(a) Lack of efficient reed conservation, 
(b) Use of permanent labour for fencing, 
(e) The use of expensive basic slag to control fern 
when ordinary super and higher stocking might have 
done the same job, 
(d) The reliance, on increased quality of wool, rather 
than increased quantity of consistent quality to 
increase income 0 
On the other hand, the levels of income were satisfactory 
throughout the period and no strong pressure existed to proceed 
more rapidly in an uncertain climatic situation, 
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SECTION 3 Ploughable Hill Country, with High Rainfall. 
CASE J. 
General: Although only partly ploughable, this property is included 
in section 3 because the dominant development methods have involved 
cultivation. At the beginning of the period, the property was 
520 acres, and a further 230 acres was leased from the Crown in 
1955, of which only 25 was grazeable at that date. 
Of this 750 acres, 150 was ploughable, the balance being 
steep, but in places capable of being worked. The soils are 
derived from Mairoa ash, with some clay loams over clay, and 
occasional limestone outcrops. About 550 acres of the total 
was productive at the start of the period (1951/52). Fertility 
was higher on the forested ridges than in the gullies and lower 
areas o 
About 15 miles west of Waitomo, the property has an 
abnormally high rainfall of about 75" and a long winter and 
late spring mitigated by good summer and autumn weather. 
It was subdivided into 30 paddocks all naturally well 
watered, but had an inadequate set of buildings. Its capital 
value in 1953 was £3,500, (before the leasehold was acquired) 
and £8,190 in 1955 on the full 750 acres. Slip erosion was 
evident in patches. No planted shelter was necessary because 
topography, especially the limestone outcrops, was sufficient. 
The owner was about 40 at the start of the present phase of 
developmeuto 
The property carried table mortgage of £2,800 at the 
beginning, with no other commitments. A wool retention 
fund of £560 was available, Overdraft finance has exceeded 
£2,000 in some years. 
Management before Development: About 50 acres had been cleared, 
cropped, and sown to pasture using horse teams before the present 
phase of development started. This enabled 700 breeding ewes, 
300 ewe hoggets and 80 other sheep to be carried. In addition, 
50 Aberdeen Angus x Hereford breeding cows were carried, 
selling 1-~ year steers and cull heifers, 
This stocking would require 20 tons of super phosphate, 
if £200 was spent annually in keeping scrub down, Some 
wether lambs could be fattened also, the balance being sold 
off-shears as stores, 
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The property is horse-shoe shaped, making stock movements 
difficult, and complicating the fencing required since 8 miles 
of the boundary is road frontage. Further, a lot of the early 
development fencing used red birch posts, which proved unsat-
isfactory and had to be replaced. 
The labour requirement was stated to be the owner, plus 
some casual labour for scrub cutting and shearing. 
The Development Process: Topdressing from 1951/52 to 1953/54 
was done by hand, d.ue to the unavailability of aeroplanes in 
the area. Even so, the owner considered he h",d developed 
"too much, too quickly". Also, most of the ea.rly cultivation 
was done by horses, until about the same time. This case is 
therefore one which suffers in an investigation of this sort 
through a very definite change in methods during the developmenL 
programme. 
Broadly the owner wanted to go slowly. Even today he 
feels he has pushed things to fast. The relevant indications 
of the speed of development can be seen in Table XIV. 
TABLE XIV CASE STUDY J. 
Year Sheep Cattle T/D N/G Wool 
(EE) (BE) (ac.) (ac.) (lb.) 
Pre-development 
1951-52 
1952-53 
1953-54 
1954-55 
1955-56 
1956-57 
1957-58 
1958-5q 
1959~6t) 
1960-61 
1961-62 
1962-63 
930 
830 
992 
1216 
1025 
1061-
1137 
1105 
885 
1185 
1166 
1166 
1395 
Post-development 
1375 
430 
434 
452 
434 
376 
354 
424 
442 
458 
440 
435 
458 
450 
200 
250 
70 
450 
280 
390 
150 
540 
550 
200 
370 
400 
9,000 
70 8,974 
9,456 
18 10,734 
60 11,180 
12 12,817 
62 16,324 
18 NA 
13,224 
11,915 
13,199 
15,889 
13,536 
14,000 
Real 
Surplus 
pre-tax 
(£) 
1884 
331 
494 
-1266 
- 487 
727 
- 423 
19 
1210 
888 
-1175 
20 
1891 
2425 
Est ~ . Tax 
on real 
Surplus 
(£) 
326 
3 
9 
2 
37 
12 
132 
518 
The methods of development were: 
(a) Sc.rub cutting, stumping" cUltivation for turnips, 
swedes, then sowing down (occasionally the crop was 
omittedL 
(b) Overs owing and topdressing following cutting and 
burn:fung, 
Although at the start, a few fat lambs were produced the 
property was basicBlly a store unit, The owner started mating 
Romney ewes to South'-Down Rams in 1952/53; an experiment which 
cost him dearly in the standard of ewe hoggets available for 
replacement. This forced him to buy in poor two-tooth ewes 
that year, and subsequently having a reduced wool clip. To 
help maintain numbers he bought lambs for fattening and sold 
them at no advantage. He discontinued the South-Down matings 
in 1954/55 and went back to a straight store basis. 
In 1959/60 he increased cow numbers, but barely maintained 
the grazing pressure of the cattle by selling all surplus stock 
as weaners or yearlings, 
In 1952/53 an implement shed was built very cheaply. 
Electricity was connected in 1953/54, and in the sane year 
an air.,strip was built on the ne;_ghbouring property to which 
the owner contributed a share of the cost. Also in 1953/54 
a workers cottage valued at £1,000 was built using the owner's 
and hired labour, 
In 1960/61 a new house was commenced, completed in 1962/63 
costing about £5,000 including labour, the owner again contrib-
uting a lot of his time. 
·Up t.ill 
on fenci!].g. 
considerable 
portion. 
1954/55 only repairs and maintenance work was done 
Following the leasing of 230 acres in 1955, 
new fencing construction was initiated on this 
The Post-Development Situation: Wintering 1,050 ewes, 450 hoggets 
growing no crop, but buying 1,000 bales of hay and using 40 tons 
of super phosphate annually this property still has some distance 
to go, Even so the owner finds it necessary, because of his 
age, to hire some casual labour for fencing and other jobs. 
Cow numbers are steady at abou+ 65, 
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The Profitabilit~ of Develoj2ment: CASE J. 
Concept Present Worth Present Worth Ratio of Eresent 
of Surplus of Deficit Worths 
£ It, 
Real Pre-Tax -£10,174 £14,658 -0.69 
Real Post-Tax 9,139 12,130 -0.75 
Money Pre-Tax 9,444 13,911 -0.68 
The process would probably not be profitable today, even 
after removing the technological effect, The rate of return on 
borrowing has· been just over 2 per cent in real terms. A 
permanent hired labour unit, plus casual labour at times, raiised 
the costs above profitable limits. The changes in stocking, 
while only a managerial mistake, illustrate the wisdom of 
planning a programme. Further the pre-occupation with house 
building, while perhaps being a necessary activity in the owner's 
view severely hampered efficient stock management. The view 
that he has "gone too fast" may well be true of the development 
programme itRelf, but is certainly not true of the rate of stock 
increase" 
Conclusions 
Only the obvious lessons can be learnt from this programme. 
The owner is a very dedicated man, with a set of values which 
allow him to be very satisfied with his achievements. In the 
strict economic sense, his mistakes, and activities, have been 
unprofitable at current borrowing rates. To him, they have 
been part of the satisfactions of life. 
CASE Ko 
General: Another King Country caGe. this 950 acre property should 
be considered with case J, since some scrub cutting occurred 
during the programme, 
The property (almost entirely leasehold) is very close to 
Otorohanga on the Hangatiki Rivero There are 10 acres of alluvial 
r~ver flats, 100 acres of rolling to steepish Mairoa ash shower, 
and the balance is rolling to steep loam over clay, At com-
mencement there were 100 acres of sown grass, 90 acres of scra~, 
155 acres of bush and the balance was rough grazing with logs 
and stumps. A 70" rainfall combines with prevalent westerlies 
to produce a good growing season with occasional dry autumns, 
The al ti tude is ·600-900' facing mainly south and wesL 
While of fair fertility this country was suffering from 
isolation. Scarce labour, no electric power and ;:'0 miles of 
rugged road all combined to make the property a you~g man's job. 
The ownor had only been in the district for 7 years~ had a young 
family and int~nded to improve out of income. 
Water supply, apart from some heavy expenditure required 
on storage tanks, was good overall, Weeds, erosion and other 
hazards were no more than normal for the King Country. (e.g. 
some ragwort.) 
In 1951/52 his total liabilities were about £2,000, mainly 
on overdraft. During the development programme this fluctuated 
up to £6,000 but other than a small private loan of about £400, 
no other major liabilities were incurred. 
Management before Development; The property was estimated to be 
capable of carrying 720 ewes, 300 ewe hoggets, 20 wethers and 
wether hoggets, plus 100 breeding cows selling all surplus as 
weaners or yearlingso In 1947, at takeover, 670 ewes and 
60 cows were being run, and the property was judged to be 
badly overstockedo Between then and 1951/52 220 acres of scrub 
had been cut anrl 24 tons of slag and 120 tons of 2:1 super/lime 
had been applied. A lot of fence repair had also been under-
taken. It was felt that 1,800 ewe equivalents in 1951/52 was 
a fully stocked situation and all surplus lambs were sold as 
storeso 
The pasture improvement programme included cultivation for 
new grass (after 1 or 2 crops of swedes or turnips), burning 
and oversowing, and straight topdressing and overs owing at 2-2~ 
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cwt, per acre, Table XV shows that the new-grass programme 
resulted in very slight increases in stock numbers, the bulk 
of the increase occurring when the heavy topdressing programme 
started, 
TABLE XV CASE STUDY K, 
Year Sheep Cattle T/D N/G Wool Real Est, Tax 
Surplus on real 
pre-tax Surplus 
(EE) (EE) (ac , ) (ac, ) (lb, ) (£) (£) 
Pre-devel opmen t 
910 640 200 10,500 1360 174 
1952~53 993 812 8 11,460 499 11 
19.53-54 1027 932 500 8 12,628 813 30 
1954-55 1024 1116 400 11,473 - 427 
1955-56 1025 1126 730 3 12,746 230 
1956-57 1052 1118 525 12 11,597 455 
1957-58 1137 826 450 11 12,270 308 
1958-59 1263 920 940 13,567 - 776 
1959-60 1470 966 600 16,694 1939 191 
1960-61 1590 988 700 18,105 2544 367 
1961-62 1635 966 750 27,517 3104 656 
1962-63 1731 920 780 20,262 2456 384 
1963-64 1700 946 720 22,719 2601 468 
Post-development 
1740 920 800 23,000 3109 810 
Throughout the period a steady 10-12 acres of grass were 
cut for hay. 
Fence maintenance· and renewals continued steadily through-
out; power was connected in 1953/54 (an expensive year including 
£400 worth offence work and 60 acres scrub cutting and regrassing)j 
house renovations in 1954/55, and new wool shed in 1956/57 -
1957/58 (£2,000 for materials). 
The Post-Development Situation: Six years of cultiva:ion and scrub 
cutting resulted in an increase in cattle numbers only, to the 
level they maintained for the balance of the programme. When 
the massive topdressing programme started, sheep numbers were 
allowed to rise more quickly. During the period mostly casual 
labour was employed, except in 1953/54 - 1956/57 when one 
permanent man was retained. The post-development hired labour 
is about £500 worth per year. 
1,350 ewes and 600 ewe hoggets, 140 cows (still selling 
all weaners), and 80 tons of super phosphate will allow 50% 
of wether lambs to be fattened. Wool clip'· has risen from 
10,500Ibs. to 23,000lbs. a substantial increase, and reflecting 
a rise in standard of sheep and feeding level as a result of 
the development. 
The Profitability of Development:~C~A~S;E __ ~K~. 
Concept 
Real Pre-Tax 
Real Post-Tax 
Money Pre-Tax 
Present Worth 
of Surplus 
£ 
£11,185 
6,201 
12,703 
Present Worth 
of Deficit 
£ 
£6,533 
5,598 
5,213 
Ratio of Present 
Worths 
1.71 
1 .11 
2.44 
The latter stages of the development programme were 
particularly successful in raising the farmers real income 
and reducing his overdraft. 
Conclusions 
One gets the impression that stock increases have been a 
little slow. But the performance from 1957/58 to 1962/63 in 
sheep numbers is fairly impressive and is clearly the source 
of the profits in this case. 
The wisdom of the differential rates of growth in total 
grazing stock appears to have been a sound proposition. If 
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the pre-development total of 1,800 ewe equivalents was excessive 
for one man, the cattle policy was clearly the right one in a 
labour-short area. 
The deveLopment shows clear signs of having been well-planned 
and executed. 
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CASE L. 
General: One of the shortest cases stl,died, this development proc-
eeded energetically from the time the present owner took bver iii mid 
1959. There are 1,200 acres of sandy, silty and clay loams 
(ex Mairoa ash) over limestone and sandstone, situated 18 miles 
from Te Kuiti in the Waitomo county. There were 120 acres of 
flat and rolling country, 600 acres of ploughable hill (with 10 
acres of scrub) and the balance was steep with 90 acres each of 
scrub and bush. The aspect is generally easterly but well open 
to the south. The climate is typical of the northern King Country 
with ample showers at all times (6~' per annum) and a short winter. 
The property had previously been farmed on a low cost under-
stocked basis with negligible topdressing. At takeover, fert-
ility levels were reasonable and the pasture, though of inferior 
species, showed evidence of clover throughout. The lack Of 
topdressing had resulted in considerable reversion to manuka 
scrub, together with some blackberry and gorse in the gullies. 
Improvements were in poor repair at takeover, although there 
were 19 paddocks. Creeks and streams provided ample water for 
all areas. No erosion problems ex~stedo 
The owner was aged about 30, recently married. The farm 
was mortgaged for £18,000 at purchase and a stock firm current 
account opened at £4,000 owing, A £500 private loan completed 
the liabilities, The new Government valuation of the property 
was £20,200 (purchased for £6,000 more), Thus the owner's only 
equity was the value of his stock and plant (about ,t9,OOO). 
Management before Development: The property being understocked 
at takeover, some drastic grazing was required to clean up the 
existing pastures before topdressing and oversowing could be 
done. 154 breeding cows were wintered the first year as a 
step towards this aim. However, the Owner felt that 100 
breeding cows would be a likely static figure in the pre-develop-
ment level, and .these CCQld have been adequately maintained by 
20 tons of super phosphate annual~y. All the ewe ho~gets 
would be wintered, the surplus being sold as two-tooth ewes. 
Half the wether lambs could be fatten.d, the balance sold as 
stores in January/February. The pre-development cattle 
policy is a stra:ightFforward breeding one, selling steers 
as w~anerS and surplus heifers at 18 months. The owner feels 
that 50 ~ 60 acres of winter feed would be necessary to carry 
this stock and this has been included in that budget, 
The owner could manage this stock comfortably on his own, 
paying £50 per year for scrub-,control. 
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The Development Process: As noted before, the first job was a 
massive clean up of existing pastures using an augmented herd 
of breeding cows, Following this, a programme of oversowing, 
topdressingcand cultivation was started, Little additional 
fencing was contemplated as much of the existing fencing 
needed repairs and tha owner thought that increases in production 
would come much faster if the grass was improved within the 
present level of fencing. Clearly, his high liabilitie,!; 
assisted this decision, 
Table XVI shows the massive topdressing programme start-
ed in 1959/60. The first dressing was of 2cwt. of 30% 
potassic super phosphate with an additional 1iozs. of cobalt 
per acre, Later dressings omitted the cobalt, D.D.T. was 
applied on new grass in one year only. (1962/63.) 
TABLE XVI CASE STUDY L. 
Year Sheep Cattle T/D N/G Wool Real Est. Tax 
Surplus on real 
pre-tax Surplus 
(EE) (EE) (ac. ) (ac .) (lb.) (£) (£) 
Pre-development 
1363 740 400 17,000 3415 957 
1959-60 1762 1360 750 20 16,808 3320 724 
1960-61 1785 1218 1000 20 22,605 1361 105 
1961-62 2070 1246 750 23,028 2521 449 
1962-63 2144 97 8 860 30 29,976 3362 701 
Post-development 
2200 950 800 30 30,000 5460 2257 
In 1962/63, 25 acres of cut and burned scrub was oversown 
and topdressed. The balance of the pasture improvement has come 
from cropping for new grass (see table). The 1962 autumn proved 
unsuitable for new grasssowings, and the 30 acres cropped (swedes) 
in the previous year was resown to swedes and chou moellier. 
About 20 acres of hay was made in the last three' years of the 
dev'"lopment, providing about 1 ,200 bales annually. Crops 
received a 3 or 4cwt. dressing of fertiliser, and new grass 
2~ to 3cwt. 
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A casual worker, paid on an hourly basis and housed in a 
whare on the property, was used for the first three years, being 
paid £4-'+5, £657 and £608 lin each of these years. In 1962/63 
a permanent cottage was built, and this worker went on to a 
weekly wage of £16. All cultivation was done by contract, the 
total cost during the development being £1,500, including 
bulldozing. 
Ewe numbers increased steadily to 1,700, but this rise 
brought serious troubles. Mainly associated with shepherding 
problems, and a high lamb wastage, the problem was apparently 
cured by putting the labour unit on a permanent basis. 
In the Pest development situation 1,700 ewes are wintered, 
ewe hoggets are"ret~ined and sold as two-tooths, 300 fat wether 
lambs are sold off shears, and 130 breeding cows are run under 
the same policy as in the pre-development budget. 
80 tons of topdressing annually is required, and 50 aones 
of scrub are left, costing £30 a year to maintain. Only 30 
acres of winter feed crop are required. 
The Profitability of Development: If the programme on this farm 
can be stopped at this point, the development has been extremely 
profitably. But the owner professes to a desire to go to the 
limit. Indeed in the year following the closing of this stu~y 
ewe numbers went to 2,100 almost double the pre-development 
level, in only 5 years. The post-development budget has assumed 
that the necessary twenty acres of winter crop were taken from 
already developed'country. If this was not to be the case, 
pasture improvement would continue to the limits of the plough-
able country available, The potential for stock increases is 
still tremendous, 
Now that a married man's cottage is built, the profitability 
of extra ewes over and above the 2,100 level is possible greater 
than for the first extra 1,000, Keeping supplementary feed 
crops to a minimum and using hay for additional feed, this unit 
could become one of the most attractive properties in the 
district. 
CASE L. 
ConceEt Present Worth Present Worth Ratio of Present 
of Sur)2lus of Deficit Worths 
£ £ 
Real Pre-Tax £24,286 £2,710 8.96 
Real Post-Tax 8,732 1,393 6.26 
Money Pre-Tax 24,362 2,647 9,20 
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The advantages of rapid stock increases are clearly 
demonstrated. The decision to concentrate on pasture improve-
ment, rather than improvement plus fencing was a wise one in 
view of the reasonable level of subdivision and the tight 
financial situation. Meeting the shepherding problem head 
on at about 1,600 breeding ewes the owner lost no time in 
securing a good man and building him a house. The increase 
in the income earning capacity of the farm was ~ore than 
sufficient to justify this decision. 
Conclusion 
Decisive thinking and acting, coupled with a willingness 
to shoulder the risks involved pay handsomely in farm devel-
opment. Farming in the northemKing Country may well be a 
little easier than in other hill country areas. But this 
owner, by concentrating on stock increases to the limit of 
the financial and labour restrictions has added one more 
piece of evidence to the case for "extra stock, extra profit." 
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CASE M. 
General' This farm was released for settlement by the Lands and 
Survey Department in 1957 and the present Owner took over in 
April of .that year on a freehold basis. 500 acres in all, 
the. farm carried 10 acres of scrub on 150 acreS of unploughable 
hill. The balanc€ comprised 150 acres plough,,-ble hill, 100 
acreS of rolling country and 100 acres of flat, of which 5. 
acres were swampy. The flat and rolling country are of Taupo 
and Tokoroa sandy silt loam over deep Taupo pumice. The 
300 acres of hill is Taupo sandy silt loam gener'l-lly over-
lying more mature ash and sometimes a brown clay~ There are 
some rhyolitic rock outcrops. Apart from the patch of scrub, 
the property was .all well grassed at takeover, showing much 
cocks foot and white clover. 
Situated on the main Taupo-Hamilton highway. the only 
drawback to its location is the distance to the nearest freezing 
works (about 70 miles). An annual rainfall of 65" is associated 
with a cold winter, heavy frosts, rather late spring and a very 
favourable summer and autumn. Its aspect is ~ainly southerly 
and it varies in altitude from 1,200' - 1,500' 
At takeover, the property had 14 paddocks, including 
two 100 acre blocks, the front ones heing watered by bore, 
pump and gravity feed system, the balance by good springs and 
creeks. 
Erosion has been nO problem as yet, but a latent tendency 
to slip and crumble could manifest itself under poor management. 
Some shelter, other than topographical, is supplied by the 
surrounding pine forests. 
This development programme is a straight-forward improvement 
of existing grassland. At takeover the owner was about 45, with 
several children, one of whom was assisting full time on the 
farm. 
The Government Valuation was £21,000, and a private valuation 
had been made at £24,000, Against this was set a table mortgage 
of £20,000. Very little call on bank or stock firm finance 
was required, 
Management before Development' At takeover, with a bl'lsic fertiliser 
of 2cwt, per acre, 1,200 Romney breeding ewes were carried, wihter-
ing 510 ewe hoggets, and selling 200 two-tooth ewes, 600 wether 
lambs were shorn and fattened, Eighty breeding cows plus 20 
2~ year heifers, twenty 18 month heifers, and 2 bulls were winter-
ed, and all steer calves sold as weaners, Fifteen acres of swedes 
were sown, cultivated and weeded using the owner's machinery. 
1,000 bales of hay were made, 
The DeveloEment Process: The stage was thus set for a massive 
pasture improvement programme, and the results are indicative 
of the potential of many settlement block farms on this type 
of country, Table XII shows the extent of the topdressing 
programme, In some years the whole place was topdressed 
twice, the country receiving up to 4cwt, per acre annually. 
In each year, the whole farm received at least 2cwt, of 
cobaltised super phosphate, and additional dressings of 
potassic super were applj.ed on up to half the property each 
year, D.DoTo super phosphate, too, was applied so that 
by the end of the development, the whole place had had 2 
dressings. The grass-grub problem at the start of devel-
opment had been acute, Part of the high fertiliser 
application in 1960/61 Vias to offset the high wool returns 
caused by the adoption of double shearing that year, 
TABLE XVII CASE STUDY 11. 
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Year Sheep Cattle T/D N/G Wool Real Est. tax 
Surplus on real 
pre-tax Surplus 
(EE) (EE) (ae 0 ) (ae 0 ) (lb 0) (£) (£) 
Pre-development 
1500 710 500 18,600 3593 1050 
1957-58 "3'13 706 500 17,872 546 1 
1958-59 1554 752 600 19,525 3030 591 
1959-60 1695 552 720 14 20,865 3865 918 
1960-61 1754 870 990 18 30,950 4662 1417 
1961-62 1805 754 464 17 26,255 5049 1765 
1962-63 1747 808 1180 17 21,027 1272 94 
1963-64' 1827 858 600 20 28,644 4919 1000 
Post~development 
2070 850 .500 20 26,400 4551 1700 
This set of data became available after the main results had 
been calculatedo 
The cropping shown in the table is not development cropping, 
but purely for provision of winter feed. Further, between 1,200 
and 2,000 bales of hay were made annually. 
Fencing, using permanent labour, was a major item in the 
developmenL At the end of the programme, 30 paddocks, all 
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well watered, were available, and the owner felt that sufficient 
had been done. This is perhaps more than is generally considered 
necessary but the heavy stocking rate and difficulties of fatten-
ing lambs on light grazing and carrying ewe hoggets for wintering 
on this country were seen to require a high degree of grazing 
control. The owner considers that even now, no more than 1,200 
lambs can be farmed at one time each year. 111us his stock pulicy 
following development is complicated by this problem, and the 
fencing policy Was designed to simplify the difficulty as much 
as possible, by providing the means for controlling grazing of 
lambs. 
A building programme, too, was undertaken, to the limits 
of available farm income. In 1957/58 a 3 stand 1,500 sq.ft. 
woolshed costing £1,100 was built. In 1959/60 a 35' x 16' 
enclosed barn costing £300 was constructed, and £200 of 
additional plant bought. Further, in 1962/63 the owner 
decided to rebuild the existing homestead, which entailed 
doubling the floor space at a cost of £3,000. 
The type of ewe carried at the start of the development 
was excellept. In 1958/59. the ewe hoggets were put to the 
ram but with 30% lambing this was discounted the next year. 
In 1961/62, with some metabolic troubles occurring in the 
breeding cows, the herd was reduced until, in the post-
development situation, a young stock buying and selling 
policy alone is operating. 
Following development, the owner has a choice of two 
stock policies. First, he can carry 1,700 breeding ewes, 
selling all surplus ewe hoggets as two-tooth ewes, and 
fattening all wether lambs, with the existing cattle policy 
(buying 158 weaners each year and selling 50 per cent fat, 
50 per cent store at 18 months). 
The second policy would winter 2,000 ewes, 1,100 of which 
are mated to the Southdown Ram. 300 replacement ewe hoggets 
could be wintered and an additional 250 two-tooth ewes bought 
in to maintain the flock. 700 black-face lambs could be 
fattened on the mother, and the balance fattened 0\1 feed. 
Under this policy, only 3 per cent of the bought-in weaners 
could be fattened. Under either system 2ewto of cobaltised 
super phosphate, plus 2cwt. of potassic super phosphate; 
4 cwt, in all, would be required over the whole propetty 
annually. The first policy would require 8 months hired 
labour, The second a full year. 
The first policy (breeding all replacements, wintering 
maximum ewe hoggets) .is chosen on budgeting the post-development 
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situation. There is, in fact, some difference in profit between 
the two situations, the extra labour and replacement stock costs 
acting against the benefits of the additional 300 ewes, and 
placing the second policy at a decided disadvantage. 
Profitability of Development: 
Concept 
Real Pre-Tax 
Real Post-Tax 
Money Pre-Tax 
CASE 
Present Worth 
of Surplus 
£ 
£8,407 
2,128 
9,217 
M. 
Present Wort·h Ratio of Present 
of Deficit Worths 
£ 
£5,011 1.67 
2,939 0.72 
5,112 1.80 
Although the increase in total ewe equivalents carried 
has not been spectacular (about 4% per year average), the 
breeding ewe flock has increased by 6% a year. In addition, 
t·he original cattle policy has been re"laced by a more flexible, 
and possibly more profitable one. The overall results to the 
owner have been very satisfactory, enabling him to build a fine 
home, and a model farm, with no increase in indebtedness. A 
valuation carried out in June 1964 placed the capital value of 
land an~ buildings and other improvements at £30,200. The 
mortgage had been reduced to £18,500, and no current accounts 
exist. The property is thus in a sound financial shape, an~ 
should continue to enjoy an increase in market value. 
Conclusion 
The owner of this farm knew his country intimately before 
he took over. His grasp of the implications of the herd winter, 
overgrazing problems, and stock management problems allowed him 
to proceed at a fast pace in spite of a normally crippling 
indebtedness. The Lessons that can be learnt from his efforts 
should have a marked effect on pumice lan~ settlement farmers, 
if this type of farm were to be used as a demonstration by 
local farm advisory officers. 
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SECTION 4 Ploughable Hill Country with Lower Rainfall 
CASES Nand O. 
General: The following two cases differ from any of the others 
because they both commenced development as Department of 
Agriculture Co-operative Demonstration Farms. Under this 
scheme, co-operating farmers were reimbursed for expenditure 
on fertilisers, seeds, and in some cases fencing materials, 
if they undertook to follow a Departmentally-devised 
development scheme. The property was then to be used in 
local extension work, as proof or otherwise of the Department's 
methods. This bulletin is not the place in which to criticise 
the concept of demonstration farms. Indeed, in the early 
1950's, when these two were started, the concept was a 
remarkable step forward. Perhaps the most that can be said 
here in general criticism is that problems of administration, 
and the legal aspects of ensuring the continued co-operation 
of the farmer were the biggest stumbling blocks. Neither 
could be foreseen, and only arose during the life of the 
initial demonstration farms. The concept of a demonstration 
farm is still valid, although not in the form typified by 
these two cases. 
Both these cases have been described previously by the 
workers most closely associated with them. Case N' completed 
its demonstration development in 1955/56, but for the purpose 
of this bulletin, subsequent development has also been analysed 
and the result examined for the profitability of the whole 
process. Case b"did not develop further as a demonstration 
farm because the owner sold the property. 
Further description is unnecessary, except in case N. 
It must be remembered that in these two cases the development 
did not involve large-scale building programmes. Also, the 
decision making (except in the later stages of case N) was 
not necessarily in the hands of the farmer. 
• See N.Z. Journal of Agriculture, vol. 94, pp. 40 • 
*' See N.Z. Journal of Agriculture, vol. 99, pp. 402. 
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CASE N. 
This 600 acre demonstration property in Akitio county 
commenced operations in 19~'7/48, and the present analysis 
follows progress through to 1960/61, Departmental financial 
help was given in the years 1951/52 to 1955/56. 
The development proceeded, following the steps described 
in the Journal of Agriculture by an increase in topdressing 
(up to 2cwt. per acre over the whole property) and by the 
further cultivation for crop and new grass of 44 acres in 
1959/60. Stock numbers incl'easea steadily, 
Year Total 
stock 
(EE) 
Pre-development 
1006 
1947-48 1081 
1948-49 1565 
1949-50 1484 
1950-51 1520 
1951-52 1804 
1952-53 1928 
1953-54 2125 
1954-55 2277 
1955-56 2269 
1956-57 2631 
1957-58 2681 
1958-59 3018 
1959-60 3196 
1960-61 3324 
Post-development 
3310 
TABLE XVIII 
. 
T/D 
(ae,) 
610 
609 
609 
325 
575 
113 
335 
142 
86 
600 
600 
540 
600 
600 
CASE 
N/G 
(ae,) 
55 
25 
65 
30 
95 
44 
STUDY N . 
Wool Real Est. Tax 
Surplus on real 
pre-tax Surplus 
(lb, ) (£) (£) 
10,000 1012 83 
10,338 - 878 24 
11,885 -1031 24 
13,227 1244 86 
11,639 - 484 24 
14,063 - 343 24 
14,724 - 890 24 
16,035 - 621 24 
18,017 .. 382 24 
NA 104 24 
24,580 1280 4 
NA 878 24 
23,688 1512 83 
27,72 3 1960 80 
28,783 3175 468 
27,700 4378 1318 
The post-development level of stocking was set at 1,500 
breeding ewes, 600 ewe hogg~ts, 600 wether hoggets, 70 cows, 
50 heifers and 50 steers, Surplus two-tooth ewes are sold in 
February, ,ether lambs are either fattened or wintered, shorn 
78 
again and sold as fat two-tooth wethers. Heifers and steers 
are generally sold at 2 years old. The annual topdressing 
programme required to carry this stock is 2cwt. of superphosphate 
over the whole property. One permanent single man is required. 
Profitability of Development: 
CASE N. 
Concept Present Worth Present Worth Ratio of Present 
of SUrJ:~lus of Deficit Worths 
£, £ 
Real Pre-Tax £17,098 £9.708 1.76 
Real Post-Tax 8,250 9,235 0.88 
Money Pre-Tax 25,598 4,580 5.58 
The success of this programme lies in its sustained increase 
in stock (6% in breeding ewes per year). In view of this result, 
it is perhaps surprlslng that more has not been done to use this 
properly as a real demonstration to local farmers. 
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CASE O. 
TABLE XIV CASE STUDY O. 
Year Sheep Cattle TID Wool Real Est, Tax 
Surplus on real 
pre~tax Surplus 
(EE) (EE) Cae,) (lb. ) (£) (£) 
Pre-development 
615 210 6~700 996 58 
1950-51 702 153 151 7,060 267 
1951-52 776 264 17'1 6,968 777 33 
1952-53 845 244 162 7,872 962 49 
1953-54 897 269 174 8,035 9 
1954-55 1088 261 164 7,594 270 
1955-56 1165 267 66 10,508 1187 64 
1956-57 1312 305 150 10,740 1024 46 
Post-development 
1394 270 110 11,700 1468 166 
Although fully written up as noted above, this case has not 
been analysed for profitability elsewhere, Its impact on 
surrounding farmers is not known, and severe trouble was 
experienced in trying to complete the designed programme, It 
is also known that labour costs contained in the accounts 
underestimate the true labour input, as Departmental officers 
undertook some of the initial topdressing and fencing work. 
ConceEt Present Worth Present Worth Ratio of Present 
of Suq~lus of Deficit Worths 
p £ ~ 
Real Pre-Tax £3.1lj9 £2,235 1 ,41 
Real Post-Tax 2,133 2,057 1,04 
Honey Pre-Tax 7; 103 19 428 4.97 
Again, the increase in stock numbers was substantial over 
the .seven year period 0 There may be some doubt about the post-
development level of stocking since the original owner was known 
to be worried about it, 
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CASE P. 
General: Commencing a development programme in 1951/52, this 700 
,.cre rehabilitation property in the Waikato developed very 
steadily through a cultivation and topdressing programme until 
1962/63. It has an annual rainfall of 52", a late spring, a 
good autumn, and is subject to strong westerly winds and drying 
out. 
There were 300 acres of rolling brown pumaceous soils 
(all cleared), 150 acres of ploughable hill loams, and the 
balance was steep Mairoa ash shower country. In all there 
were 70 acres of scrub and fern, and 50 acres of bush. It 
does not therefore fit neatly into anyone of the lOur' 
classifications used. 
At. the start of the development a good deal of at ten Hon 
was required by the boundary fences and buildings, especially 
the house, which had been shifted on to the property from 
elsewhere. 
Good reliable creeks secured for stock water supply. 
There was no erosion hazard and the only major wee a problem 
was thistles. In ganeral the place was exposed, but relat-
ively easy to work. 
In 1953 the property was valued £12,800 (including 
improvements). Against this was set a £10,000 1st mortgage. 
Management before Development: In 1951/52 the property carried 
an orthodox flock of 865 ewes, 340 ewe hoggets (all carried 
through to two-tooth before culling) and the usual rams and 
killers. A very few fat wether lambs were sold. 45 breeding 
cows, together with replacement heifers, were carried and 
steers were kept until 2 years old. 12,OOOlb. of wool .as 
sold. 
At takeover it was felt that the grasses already 
established were disappearing through over-grazing. A fairly 
heavy programme of topdressing (2cwt. every se"ond year) 
was necessary to hold the pasture composition static. 
The property was run as a one man unit, although as 
further development got under way, a permanent man was hired. 
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The Development Process: Table XX sets out the main steps in the 
pasture improvement programme, These were essentially: 
(a) A stepping up in topdressing and oversowing of existing 
pastures; 
(b) burning, topdressing and oversowing in one year (140 
aCres 1957/58); 
(C) grass renewal by two feed crops followed by a new grass 
sowing, 
By the end of development the only scrub left was 10 acres, 
with a negligible annual maintenance costo 
TABLE XX 
Year Sheep Cattle 
(EE) (EE) 
Pre-development 
1080 
1951-52 1112 
1952-53 1142 
1953-54 1160 
1954-55 1117 
1955-56 1127 
1956-57 1257 
1957-58 1323 
1958-59 1500 
1959-60 1545 
1960-61 1523 
1961 ... 62 1577 
1962-63 1625 
Post-development 
1580 
620 
620 
684 
780 
804 
1002 
976 
1018 
1112 
1172 
1150 
1226 
1254 
1240 
CASE STUDY p, 
T/D N/G 
500 
500 
500 
500 
500 
450 
580 
640 
528 
600 
600 
800 
627 
600 
30 
12 
12 
12 
18 
20 
20 
17 
Wool Real 
Surplus 
pre-tax 
(lbo) (£) 
12,000 
14,238 
11,888 
10,868 
13,984 
10,123 
12,439 
14,380 
16,230 
16,398 
18,529 
16,568 
17,277 
17,000 
2775 
1226 
878 
641 
169 
69 
- 616 
2212 
2192 
2022 
1052 
2408 
2757 
Est, Tax 
on real 
Surplus 
(£) 
658 
86 
23 
306 
366 
257 
75 
348 
488 
1210 
This property was not blessed with good fencing, y~rds" 
or buildings at the start of development. During the process 
a vigorous and sustained attack was made on the problem, 
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The Post-Development Situation: Flock composition following devel-
opment in 1962/63 could be stabilised at 1,150 breeding ewes, 
450 ewe hoggets, 350 wether hoggets (wintered and sold fat), 
and the usual rams and killerso 110 breeding cows plus replac-
ements could be carried and all steers were kept and sold fat at 
2 yearso Labour requirements would be very small, the only 
hired labour being for casual and haymaking worko Two cwto 
of superphosphate every second year would be ample to maintain 
the pastures under the new stocking rateo 
Since about 150 acres of new grass was sown during the 
period, and continuous topdressing carried out, the increase 
in total ewe equivalents at about 5% per year was disappointing. 
The practice of double cropping has not paid dividends, probably 
because a 5% increase ewe equivalent could well be sustained 
by the much cheaper overs owing and topdressing of even ploughable 
countryo 
.The Profi tabili ty of Development: 
Concept 
Real Pre-Tax 
Real Post-Tax 
Money Pre-Tax 
Present Worth 
of Surplus 
£ 
-£4,627 
- 4,838 
-
1,190 
Present Worth Ratio of Present 
of Deficit Worths 
£ 
£13,871 ~0033 
9,585 -0050 
10,543 -0011 
The long period of development on this property has depressed 
income considerablyo Even the increase of £1,116 in real income 
at the end does not adequately make up for the years of self-
sacrifice during development. 
CASE Ro 
General: In direct contrast to Case M, which was a fully economic 
unit before the improvement began, this property of 345 acres 
was barely an economic unit to start, A pre-development surplus 
of only £900 was available for personal drawings, tax, interest, 
capital repayment, and capital expenditures, The farm is 10 
miles from Taupo, 140 acres are hilly, of which 40 are 
unploughable, and were unproductive at A:he start; 105 acres 
are rolling, and the balance flat. The flat land is Taupo 
rubbly pumice and the rolling country Taupo silty pumice. 
Both are very poor quality soils, the flats especially. The 
hilly country has a sandy shallow topsoil, having lost much 
of its Kaharoa ash shower covering. 
The area's climate is typical of the Central Plateau, with 
strong cold winds, many frosts, a ,long 'winter 'and a late 
spring. Good growth is possible in the summer. The rainfall 
is 55" - 60", and the altitude ranges from 1,600 - 1,750.' 
The hilly country l,ies half northeast, and half southwesL 
At takeover, it was questionable whether the farm would 
ever make an economic unit. The owner was on a very restricted 
personal budget of £300-£400 per year. But he was extremely 
energetic, and keen to get the property to its maximum carrying 
capaci ty as soon as possible 0 In addition to thi3',fertili ty 
problems already mentioned, the country was dotted with single 
pine trees, a feature of this country. Besides the grazing 
space they occupied and the obvious need for their disposal 
ultimately, they constitued a stock health problem - especially 
to lambing ewes and young lambs. The health problem was 
further complicated by a selenium deficiency, not detected 
or rectified till 2 years after development had started. 
There is a danger in a case of this sort in confusing 
the effects of increased carrying capacity witb the trace 
element problem. Thus the profitability of the farm has been 
raised, largely because the lambing percentage rose from 
85% to 110% through selenium treatment. While no account has 
been taken of this "exogenous!' contribution to profitability 
in the calculations, it must be considered in this context. 
Profitability is thus biassed upwards, if development capital 
is considered as the sole source of the increased profitability. 
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Management before Development: At takeover the property carried, 
fairly comfortably, 8'-,0 ewes, 14 rams and 30 in cal f heifers. 
But no replacement stock could be wintered at this stocking rate. 
The pre-development situation is taken to be 800 ewes, 200 
ewe hoggets, 11+ rams, and 30 breeding c QWS with required 
replacement stock. All surplus cattle would be sold as 
weaners or yearlings, the usual practice in the district and 
surplus lambs could be fattened. At this stocking rate, 
at least 2cwt. superrhosphate per acre per year would be 
necessary and at least 15 acres of swedes. 1,000 bales of 
contract bailed hay, from 30 acres would be needed to supplement 
the cattle feed in the winter. Of interest is the £17 per ton 
(bought and on) cost of superphosphate in this area. 
The owner could, of course, manage this number of stock 
very easily on his own. 
Maintenance of fencing on the property was a grave problem 
according to the owner. Natai posts with an apparently short 
life, had been used by the settlement authorities, and these 
needed periodic renewal. Further, the amount of fencing was 
said not ,to be sufficient, although it is well known that these 
farms are purposely handed over in a less than developed condition. 
At takeover, the Government Valuation was £12,500 (Improvements 
£10,530). Against this, was the extremely high mortgage of 
£16,000 plus a State Advances Corporation current account of 
£2,000. Clearly. eVen the personal budget figure of £300 could 
be thought excessive, Further, a stock firm current account 
closed in debt to £500 in the first and second year of occ~pation. 
The m~age was interest and repayment free for the first two 
years, after which interest (alone) became payable, At this 
stage interest charges amounted to about £800 a year on all 
debts, At the time of writing the mortgage is still at £16,000, 
and the owner's equity no greater than before, apart from a 
£3,000 increase in the value of land and improvements. A 
glance at Table XXI will show that, so far as money in his 
pocket is concerned, this owner is not much better off than he 
was, and is unlikely to improve his position until the mortgage 
is repaid, a long time ahead. The analysis assumes a debt 
free position, i,e. no interest charges are included. 
TABLE XXI CASE STUDY Ro 
Year Sheep Cattle T/D N/G Wool Real EsL Tax 
Surplus on real 
pre-tax Surplus 
(EE) (EE) (ac ,) (ac 0 ) (Ib 0) (5) (5) 
Pre-development 
864 180 340 15 10,000 897 74 
1958-59 1178 404 300 20 17,773 1190 31 
1959-60 1361 294 270 36 14,897 1232 40 
1960-61 1238 264 280 21 13,063 2459 430 
1961-62 NA NA NA NA NA 1316 86 
Post-development 
1180 280 340 20 17,000 1463 215 
The Development Process: Obviously this development was financed 
out of current income, achieved only through stringent domestic 
budgeting, In a normal situation the owner would have to 
increase one or another source of current working capital, if 
he had lived at anything like a normal standard, 
The first job was fencingo No information on new fencing 
done is available, unfortunately, but a study of the accounts 
suggests that £500 - £600 has been spent on materials alone, 
and some of the labour, at least, has been contract, 
Unfortunately, the records for the first 1~ years of 
occupation (and improvement) are missing, other than the annual 
accounts and balance sheeto However, these suggest that 
superphosphate application was very heavy (probably 3cwt/ac. 
overall) in these periodso The cropping and topdressing 
programme for the balance of the period are as indicated, In 
1959/60, at least 35 acres of crop (15 rape, 20 swedes) had 
been grown. Between 1,200 and 1,700 bales of hay were made 
annually, 
This type of country with its poor bottom soils requires 
extensive grass renewal programmes, or very high rates of phosphate 
dressing, to maintain the flats in good pasture, On this 
property, however, the flats produce poor root crops, and 
thus most of the cropping was done on the hillier country. 
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The post-development winter stock situation is 1,000 ewes, 
200 ewe hoggets. and 70 dry cattle, the cattle being bought as 
weaners or at 18 months; each type being kept for 6 months. 
At least 20 acres of winter swedes, and 3~cwt. of superphosphate 
overall is needed to maintain this level. There are now 21 
paddocks, and the labour force remains the owner, only with 
contract shearing and cultivation. Wool production is assessed 
at 17.000Ib., compared with 10,000 in the pre-development 
situation. Nearly all wether lambs can be fattened. 
Profitability of Development: 
Concept 
Real Pre-Tax 
Real Post-Tax 
Money Pre-Tax 
Present Worth 
of SurElus 
£ 
£9,690 
7.591 
9,807 
Present Worth Ratio of Present 
of Deficit '/Iorths 
£ 
NIL NIL 
NIL NIL 
NIL NIL 
This improvement programme, notwithstanding the tight 
situation in which it was conducted, has been profitable. In 
no year has the real farm surplus fallen below the pre-development 
surplus. It must be asked however whether the absolute level 
of income achieved in the post-development situation is high 
enough? 
The purchase of extra land, and the extension of the 
property to more economic levels in this way would enable the 
owner to better utilise the added value of this property, 
and meet future changes in costs and prices. 
Conclusions 
While this case could be viewed as another example of what 
pumice land can do, it must be remembered that the farmer did it 
at considerable personal sacrifice. Further, the property is 
not far off potential, and even greater efforts could not produce 
much added profit. The conclusion can only be, for a person 
requiring a reasonable living standard, that this property was too 
small, It offers little real increase in standard of living or 
equity from improvement. If a farmer of thi8 calibre was put on 
a place of real potential he would do equally as good a job, and 
be more productive in absolute termso The same comments very 
likely apply to much of this settlement block farming. 
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